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ARTICLES
TEMPORARY INSANITY: THE LONG TALE OF
TAHOE-SIERRA PRESER VA TION COUNCIL
AND ITS QUIET ENDING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
J. David Breemer*
1. INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 2002, the United States Supreme Court issued its
decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,' a case involving the question whether a temporary
building moratorium that prevents all economically beneficial uses of
property during its effective period amounts to a taking of private
property requiring just compensation.2 In a narrow decision, the
Court held that the balancing test of Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City,' rather than a per se rule similar to that announced
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,4 determines whether
compensation is required for land use regulations designed
temporarily to freeze all property development.' For the Tahoe area
landowners who argued for application of Lucas' categorical takings
rule, the Court's decision ends a battle that has raged in the courts for
almost two decades.
. 2001-2002 Research and Litigation Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation's Program for
Judicial Awareness; J.D. 2001, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of
Hawaii at Manoa; M.A., University of California, Davis; B.A., University of
California, Santa Barbara. The author wishes to thank R.S. Radford for his helpful
thoughts and comments during the drafting of this article.
1. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002) [hereinafter Tahoe-Sierra].
2. See id. at 1470-73. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides, "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
3. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central takings test considers such factors as
"the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action." (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 617 (2001)).
4. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking").
5. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489-90.
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The dispute has its origins in the 1970s, when the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency ("TRPA") began implementing land use regulations
in the Tahoe basin in an effort to halt the growth of algae in Lake
Tahoe. The agency's efforts culminated in a 1981 "temporary" ban on
development6 that, for many area property owners, has remained in
place to this day,7 making it impossible for these owners to build
vacation and retirement homes planned long before the agency took
steps to preclude residential construction.'
In 1984, TRPA's aggressive regulatory tactics prompted the owners
of more than 450 single-family lots to file suit against the agency as
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council ("The Council"),9 in an effort to
establish that the agency owed compensation for taking private
property pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."0 Since then, the case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency has produced five
published federal district court opinions,'' almost an equal number of
opinions from the Ninth Circuit," two denials of certiorari from the
Supreme Court 3 and now, a Supreme Court opinion. In TSPC IV,
the last Ninth Circuit opinion, the Court of Appeals extinguished the
only claims that had survived the courts' slow and systematic whittling
6. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency ("TSPC
IV"), 216 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to distinguish the Supreme Court's
opinion in the Tahoe dispute, it will be referred to as "Tahoe-Sierra." All of the
Ninth Circuit's previous decisions in the case will be referred to as "TSPC" followed
by a numeral to indicate the particular iteration of that court's review. District court
decisions in the case will simply be referred to as "TSPC."
7. See Michael M. Berger, What's "Normal" About Planning Delay?, in Taking
Sides on Takings Issues: Public and Private Perspectives 273, 279 (Thomas E.
Roberts ed., 2002) [hereinafter Taking Sides] ("Through this series of rolling
enactments, TRPA has effectively blocked construction of [some Tahoe landowners']
homes for the past two decades, and that prohibition has become permanent.").
8. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1473 (2002) (noting that 400 members of the
Council "purchased their properties prior to the effective date of the 1980
Compact ... primarily for the purpose of constructing 'at a time of their choosing' a
single-family home 'to serve as a permanent, retirement or vacation residence"').
9. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 769.
10. The owners who make up the Council are not the only ones to have
challenged TRPA under the Takings Clause. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); Lake County Estates Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Kelly v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 855
P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1993).
11. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999); TSPC, 992 F. Supp. 1218 (D.
Nev. 1998); TSPC, 808 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Nev. 1992); TSPC, 638 F. Supp. 126 (D. Nev.
1986); TSPC, 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 1985).
12. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 34 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994) ("TSPC III"); Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir.
1991) ("TSPC II"); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990) ("TSPC I").
13. See California v. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 514 U.S. 1036 (1995);
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 499 U.S. 943
(1991).
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away of the Council's action by concluding that a 1981-1984
moratorium on development did not take their property, even though
it precluded all economically beneficial use of land during its effective
period.14 It was this decision that prompted the High Court's
intervention.
In granting certiorari in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court positioned itself to
clarify the scope of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 5 a case traditionally read to
require compensation for excessive property restrictions, whether
temporary or permanent in nature. 6 More particularly, Tahoe-Sierra
raised the question whether First English compelled courts to look
solely at the effective period of a temporary restriction when engaging
in takings analysis, or whether it allowed them to consider the impact
of such regulations in the context of the entire temporal life of a
parcel. 7 Ultimately, the Court adopted the latter view and went on to
conclude that, with respect to the temporal dimension of property, the
relevant parcel is the "temporal whole."1" This determination
effectively restricts Lucas to cases involving "permanent" land use
restrictions"s and thus elevates the prominence of Penn Central in the
temporary takings calculus."' Unfortunately, since the Council's
14. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 782.
15. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
16. See infra notes 145, 169 and accompanying text.
17. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 778. This problem is traditionally called the
"denominator" or "relevant parcel" question and is explained by the Court in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictus:
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that
has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit
of property "whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction."
480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1165,1192 (1967)).
In practice, the relevant parcel issue typically involves a determination of
whether a portion of the claimant's property can be isolated for takings analysis. As a
result, some have taken to referring to the issue as the problem of "conceptual
severance." See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1674 (1988).
In TSPC IV, the Ninth Circuit utilizes the "conceptual severance" terminology. See
TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 774. This paper will generally refer to the overall issue as the
"relevant parcel" problem. In any event, as the Court notes above, the issue is often
of critical importance: if the relevant parcel is defined narrowly, there is a greater
likelihood that the challenged regulation will prevent all economically viable use of
property and therefore amount to a per se taking under Lucas. On the other hand, if
the relevant parcel is defined more broadly, some beneficial use will typically be
present, thus triggering application of Penn Central's balancing test. See generally
John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1535 (1994).
18. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483-84 (2002).
19. See id. at 1484 (noting that Lucas was "carved out" for the case where
regulation "permanently" idles a piece of property).
20. See id. at 1486 (describing Penn Central's ad-hoc factual approach as "the
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claims proceeded solely under Lucas, the emergence of Penn Central
as the governing standard required the dismissal of their case2 and,
for many elderly property owners, the closing of any opportunity to
receive some compensation for being forced to maintain their
property as an ecological preserve for approximately two decades.
This article tells the story of the Council's fight for just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment, analyzes the legal issues
raised by the Ninth Circuit's decision and reviews the Supreme
Court's recent opinion. Part II reviews the facts and procedural
history of Tahoe-Sierra. Part III summarizes the Ninth Circuit's
decision in TSPC IV, discusses the Court's treatment of the difficult
issues raised in Tahoe-Sierra and comments on the state of takings law
after Tahoe-Sierra. Part IV explores the rationale underlying the
Court's decision and how it relates to the Supreme Court's prior
takings jurisprudence. Part V concludes that TRPA engaged in a
taking under Penn Central, if not under the per se rule of Lucas.
II. THE ORIGINS OF TAHOE-SIERRA
A. Factual History of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, it was noted that Lake Tahoe was
losing some of its renowned transparency.22 Lake Tahoe's declining
clarity was subsequently associated with an ecological process in
which water accumulates nutrients and begins to support the growth
of algae and other organisms that cause clouding.23 Increased nutrient
loading of the lake was in turn tied to higher rates of erosion and
runoff in the areas around the lake, which was itself blamed on rapid
development of the Tahoe area.24
better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking").
21. See id. at 1485 ("Recovery under a Penn Central analysis is also foreclosed
both because petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and because they did not
appeal from the District Court's conclusion that the evidence would not support it.").
22. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,1231 (D. Nev. 1999).
23. Id. The court explained, "As algal growth in the lake increases, its clarity
decreases. In other words, the lake undergoes what is termed 'eutrophication.'
Eutrophication is the process of becoming more 'eutrophic,' which, at least as it
relates to a lake, is defined as 'rich in dissolved nutrients ... '
Id. (citation omitted).
24. Id. The court described the process by which development causes
eutrophication:
Increased development causes increased nutrient loading of the lake largely
because of the increase in impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting
from that development....
The concentrations of water running off areas of impervious coverage ...
flow rapidly over areas of uncovered earth, picking up nutrient-rich topsoil
and bits of vegetation and debris as they go. The increase in run-off thus
causes more debris and soil - and hence more nitrogen and phosphorous - to
reach the lake than under natural conditions.
[Vol. 71
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In 1968, California and Nevada set out to address and manage the
perceived algae problems at Lake Tahoe by entering into a regional
planning compact. Approved by the United States Congress a year
later,26 the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact ("Compact") created a
bi-state body, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"), to
regulate development in and around the Tahoe Basin.27 In 1972,
TRPA took the first major step in that direction by adopting an
ordinance that classified all land in the Tahoe Basin into seven "land
capability districts. '28 Based largely on their susceptibility to runoff,
the districts were assigned a "land coverage coefficient-a
recommended limit on the percentage of such land that could be
covered by an impervious surface. ' 29 Considered to be "high hazard"
areas, the steepest lands (designated districts 1, 2 and 3) and
properties near streams (termed "stream environment zones" or
"SEZs") were assigned the lowest allowable level of coverage. 31' This
classification system was accompanied by related recommendations
for permissible development, but generally did not restrict basic
single-family home construction."
When the 1972 plan failed to produce sufficient improvement in the
clarity of Lake Tahoe to satisfy the governments of California and
Nevada,32 the states amended the Compact in 1980 to prod TRPA into
taking a less generous stance toward residential property
development.33 In particular, TRPA was given eighteen months to
Id.
25. Id. at 1232
26. Id. Congressional approval was required because, as a bi-state agreement, the
Compact was subject to Article I, section 10, cl. 3 of the Constitution, which provides,
No state shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage,
Keep Troops, or Ships of War in Time of Peace, enter into any agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
27. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
28. Id. Land was divided into districts "based largely on steepness, but also taking
into account flood hazard, high water tables, poorly drained soils, landslides, fragile
flora and fauna, and soil erodibility." Id.
29. Id. The adopted land capability system recommended that none of the lands
in "SEZ" areas be covered by an impervious surface, that only 1% of the lands in
"capability district" 1 and 2 be similarly altered and that lands in district 3 remain
subject to a 5% limit. Districts 4, 5 and 6 were assigned values of 20%, 25% and 30%
respectively.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1233. ("[A]lthough Ordinance No. 4 adopted the [capability district]
system, it allowed numerous exceptions to the coverage recommendations. The
building of new residential housing was not particularly limited.").
32. Id. In fact, "California became so dissatisfied that it pulled its funding from
TRPA, and its own agency, the California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (formed
in 1967, prior to adoption of the Compact), began to impose stricter regulations on
that part of the basin lying within California." Id.
33. Id.
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establish new "environmental threshold carrying capacities,"
reflecting the level of environmental protection necessary to maintain
the scenic and recreational value of the Basin.34 Twelve months after
that, TRPA was expected to enact a new regional plan in keeping with
the carrying capacities.35 Finally, and importantly, TRPA was directed
to review all current projects and establish temporary restrictions on
development in the basin "pending the adoption of the new regional
plan."36
1. The 1981-1984 Development Ban
TRPA responded to the 1980 Compact by adopting Ordinance 81-
5. Among other things, this ordinance made "grading, clearing,
removal of vegetation, filling or creation of land coverage" in districts
1-3 subject to TRPA regulation and thus, to permitting requirements
premised on the impervious surface recommendations.37 While an
exception raised the possibility of some residential construction on
lands on the Nevada side of the basin in excess of the recommended
limits, California properties in the same districts were bound by the
impervious surface recommendations.38 On the other hand, SEZ
lands on both sides were strictly regulated, with grading and similar
activities absolutely prohibited.39 Indeed, Ordinance 81-5 provided in
part that
Notwithstanding any other provision of this ordinance or of any
other ordinance of the Agency, no person shall perform any grading,
clearing, removal of vegetation, filling or creation of land coverage,
within or upon a stream environment zone ("SEZ"), as described or
depicted upon maps contained in the Plan.
40
The overall effect of Ordinance 81-5 was "temporarily [to] prohibit
most residential and commercial construction on land capability
34. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1994). The Compact specifically
defined environmental threshold carrying capacity as
an environmental standard necessary to maintain a significant scenic,
recreational, educational, scientific or natural value of the region or to
maintain public health and safety in the region. Such standards shall include
but not be limited to standards for air quality, water quality, soil quality, soil
conservation, vegetation preservation and noise.
Id. at 768 n.3.
35. Id. at 768.
36. Id.
37. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234 (D. Nev. 1999).
38. Id. at 1235. Ordinance 81-5 provided that surface coverage in excess of the
recommended limits, up to 20% of the lot, was possible, provided that special findings
were made and a permit then obtained. However, this exception applied only to the
Nevada side properties because the ordinance also kept water regulations in effect on
the California side that called for absolute adherence to the strict surface coverage
recommendations. Id. at 1234-35.
39. Id. at 1234.
40. TRPA Ordinance 81-5, § 3.00 (1984).
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districts 1, 2 and 3 and SEZs until a new regional plan was
developed."'"
With most development completely halted on both sides of the
Basin under Ordinance 81-5, TRPA began to identify the
"environmental threshold carrying capacities" required as the basis
for a new regional plan by the 1980 compact.42 When the agency
finally completed this process on August 26, 1982, two months past
the deadline established by the 1980 Compact, it had about one year
left in which to create and finalize the new regional plan contemplated
by the amended Compact.43 As the deadline drew near without any
plan in sight, TRPA enacted another temporary moratorium,
Resolution 83-21, which suspended all permitting activities for an
additional ninety days.' This ninety-day period also came and went
without completion of the Regional Plan, and the moratorium
continued by default until the new plan was finally adopted on April
26, 1984.45
2. The 1984 and 1987 Regional Plans
If Tahoe area landowners expected the 1984 Regional Plan to open
the door to renewed construction, they were sorely disappointed. The
1984 Plan provided that "no projects proposing any land coverage at
all in Class 1-3 and SEZ lands would be considered, with limited
exceptions for 'regional public facilities, public outdoor recreation
facilities and public works projects. ' '4 6 In short, private improvements
were just as forbidden under the 1984 Plan as under the temporary
ordinances. Still, the new plan was not sufficiently restrictive for the
State of California and an environmental group. They filed suit
against TRPA on the same day the plan was adopted and ultimately
succeeded in convincing a judge to issue a preliminary injunction
barring implementation of the 1984 Plan.47 Under the injunction,
41. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
42. Id. at 1235.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1235-36. It is interesting to note that no official action was ever taken to
extend the ban implemented by Resolution 83-21 after the ninety-day period had
expired. As the district court explained,
At the end of ninety days, the ban was extended-although not by any
affirmative action by TRPA, and not, contrary to what the defendants have
implied, for any set period of time. The Minutes of the TRPA Governing
Board.. . indicate that TRPA staff members advised the Board that the end
of the ninety day period was approaching, and that, absent an order by the
Board to the contrary, the staff would continue to observe the moratorium,
since the conditions that had led to its imposition in the first place still
existed.
Id.
46. Id. at 1236.
47. Id.
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TRPA was precluded from considering any permit applications, a
restriction that, once upheld by the Ninth Circuit, remained in place
until a completely new regional plan was adopted in 1987. 4" For
property owners in districts 1-3 and SEZs, the injunction simply
continued TRPA's 1981 moratorium on residential construction.
On July 2, 1987, TRPA adopted an entirely new Regional Plan, thus
ending the injunction against the issuance of development permits.
The 1987 Plan sought
to accomplish three major objectives: (1) to place a ceiling on the
total amount of residential development that may occur in the
Basin; (2) to control the pace of development by limiting the
number of building permits that may be issued each year; and (3) to
limit the amount of impervious coverage resulting from permitted
development. 49
To accomplish these goals, TRPA implemented a new system-the
Individual Parcel Evaluation System ("IPES")-for determining
which residential lots were suitable for building.5" Under this scheme,
residential lots were required to receive a minimum IPES score,
reflecting "the predictable effect of the parcel's development on the
water quality of the Lake," in order to qualify for construction."1
From the start, SEZ lands automatically received a score of zero and
were thus "ineligible for residential development at any time. '"52 For
the owners of these lands, the changes incorporated into the 1987 Plan
failed to change the fact that they were prevented from putting their
property to economically beneficial use.
B. The Long and Winding Legal Road
Tahoe area landowners did not wait for the enactment of the 1987
Plan to join the battle over TRPA's actions in the Tahoe basin.
Rather, a group of roughly 700 Tahoe area landowners
(approximately 300 of whom have died while waiting in vain for the
resolution of their claims)53 sued TRPA as Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council soon after the 1984 Plan was proposed, alleging deprivation of
all economically beneficial use of their land and violation of their
rights to due process and equal protection. 4 The plaintiffs initially
48. Id.
49. Brief for Respondent at 5, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725 (1997) (No. 96-243).
50. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 729.
51. Brief for Respondent, supra note 49, at 9.
52. Id.
53. See Gideon Kanner, Temporary Takings, The Nat'l L. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at
A21.
54. TSPC, 611 F. Supp. 110, 112 (D. Nev. 1985). The landowners sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against TRPA and its directors for violating their
rights to due process and equal protection and their rights under the Takings Clause
by barring them from "making any reasonable or practical use of their property." Id.
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grouped themselves according to state, with the California landowners
suing in the federal district court for the Eastern District of California
and the Nevada plaintiffs filing a complaint in the Nevada District
Court. Following a Ninth Circuit reversal of adverse decisions in
these two district courts, the cases were consolidated in the Nevada
court. This forced California residents, whose attorney's offices were
naturally in California, to prosecute their suit, which included claims
against California, in the state of Nevada. In addition to being
grouped by state (a division that continued to exist after
consolidation), the landowners were classed according to the nature of
their property. One group consisted of owners of land within land
capability districts 1-3; the other included owners of SEZ lands."
Finally, the landowners' claims were divided by time periods
corresponding to the effective dates of the various ordinances and
plans challenged by the group.56
1. TSPC I and H: The Ninth Circuit Opens the Procedural Gates
When the landowners' initial allegations came before them, the
United States District Courts for Nevada and the Eastern District
Court of California dismissed all of the Council's claims on sovereign
immunity or ripeness grounds.57 More specifically, both courts
The plaintiffs also sought money damages from TRPA, Nevada and California for
violations of the Takings Clause. TSPC additionally requested just compensation,
injunctive and declaratory relief because the 1984 Regional Plan deprived them of the
benefits of public improvements and therefore violated their rights under the due
process, contract, equal protection and takings clauses. Finally, TSPC alleged that
TRPA "inversely condemned" their property under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On this theory,
it asked for injunctive relief and money damages against all defendants, including the
members of the governing board of TRPA. Id.
55. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
56. See id. TSPC's claims were initially divided into three time periods:
Period I covers August 24, 1981, to August 26, 1983, the time during which
Ordinance 81-5 was in effect; Period II covers August 27, 1983, to April 25,
1984, the time during which Resolution 83-21 was in operation; Period III
covers April 26, 1984, to July 1, 1987, the period that ran from the enactment
of the 1984 plan to the enactment of the 1987 Plan ....
Id.
Later, after TSPC was allowed to include a claim based on the 1987 Plan, a
Period IV was added that "covers July 2, 1987, to the present, the time during which
the 1987 Plan has been in effect." Id. For the purposes of clarity, this article will refer
to the various period-claims by regulation and/or associated dates.
57. In the initial proceedings, the Nevada district court dismissed the SEZ
landowners' takings claims against California and Nevada on the ground that the
states were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. TSPC, 611 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (D. Nev. 1985). The court also held that
TRPA was immune from the takings claims asserted by SEZ landowners because the
agency did not have the power to condemn property and thus could not be forced into
such an act by an action for inverse condemnation under the Takings Clause. Id. at
116. This portion of the decision was based on Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1358 (1977) aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Lake Country Estates Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
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apparently rejected the takings claims on the ground that TRPA was
immune from suit on such a basis because it had no formal power to
take private property. 8  On appeal in TSPC I, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the Nevada district court's judgment that the Nevada
plaintiffs' suit would not lie because the agency lacked formal
authority to condemn property. 9 In the same decision, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Council's takings claims were not rendered moot
by the enactment of the 1987 Regional Plan. Citing the Supreme
Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit declared: "if
Ordinance 81-5 or the 1984 Plan effected a taking, even for a short
time, plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation for that temporary
taking." ''1 In sum, TSPC I allowed the Nevada SEZ plaintiffs' claims
for just compensation to go forward with respect to the planning
moratorium in effect between August 29, 1983 and April 26, 1984,61
and permitted the class 1-3 landowners to assert the same claim for
the eight month period in which Resolution 83-21 extended the 1981
moratorium. 2
In TSPC II, a different panel of the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
the decision in TSPC I to review the claims of the California
plaintiffs. 63 Although the TSPC II panel adopted most of the holdings
in the Nevada case, its decision differed inasmuch as it determined
that the takings claims of all the California landowners were ripe with
respect to Ordinance 81-5.' The court also rejected the conclusion
(1979), an earlier case in which the Ninth Circuit rejected a takings claim against
TRPA on the ground that it had no power to condemn property. As to the takings
claims asserted by the class 1-3 landowners, the court granted summary judgment for
TRPA and its directors on the ground that these plaintiffs had failed to avail
themselves of the exceptions allowing for the possibility of construction by Nevada
property owners. Their claims were, therefore, unripe. TSPC, 638 F. Supp. 126, 132-
33 (D. Nev. 1986).
58. TSPC, 611 F. Supp. 110, 116-17 (D. Nev. 1985); TSPC 11, 938 F.2d 153, 155
(9th Cir. 1991).
59. TSPC 1, 911 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1990).
60. Id. at 1335. The court also reinstated the plaintiffs' claim for recovery of
assessments levied against property owners, with the caveat that recovery could only
be had against the agency that actually collected the assessments and that "any
compensation the plaintiffs receive on their taking claim would have to be offset by
any reimbursement" they received for assessments. Id. at 1342 n.10.
61. See id. at 1339.
62. Id. The TSPC I court affirmed the district court in all other respects. In
particular, it held that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief stemming from
TRPA's actions prior to enactment of the 1987 regional plan were rendered moot by
the adoption of that plan. Id. at 1335. In addition, the court affirmed that the takings
claims of the class 1-3 plaintiffs for the period of the 1981-84 moratorium were unripe
because they failed to submit applications for development to the agency under a
case-by-case review that included a limited exception to Ordinance 81-5. Id. at 1339.
Finally, the court held that any takings claims based on the 1984 plan were unripe
because the Council did not seek to amend the plan. Id. at 1336-37.
63. TSPC II, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 156. This conclusion was based on the fact that, unlike the Nevada
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that the landowners' claims against the 1984 Plan were unripe.65 The
case was then remanded so that the district court could determine if
the plaintiffs had suffered a temporary taking as a result of the
enactment of the Ordinance and/or Plan.66 It was at this point that the
Nevada and California cases were consolidated in the Nevada district
court.
2. TSPC III: This Time, It's a Statute of Limitations
Following the Ninth Circuit's decisions in TSPC I and H, the
landowners were permitted to amend their complaint against TRPA
to include a takings claim arising from the 1987 plan, as well as from
the 1981-84 moratoria and the 1984 plan.67 It mattered little; the
district court rejected the new takings claims on the ground that they
were barred by a statute of limitation in the Compact that required
legal action against TRPA to be filed within 60 days.68 The same court
also dismissed the takings claims pertaining to the 1984 Plan on
ripeness grounds, favoring the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit panel in
TSPC I over that expressed in TSPC 11.69
In TSPC III, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Nevada district court
once more, holding that none of the takings allegations were barred
by the statute of limitations in the 1980 Compact, when brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.7' For good measure, the Ninth Circuit admonished
the district court not to allow TRPA to raise any other potentially
applicable statute of limitations defenses since it had asserted only the
limitation in the Compact. 71  The case was then remanded to the
plaintiffs, the California plaintiffs could not avail themselves of an exception in the
ordinance allowing for the possibility of some use of property.
65. See id. at 157. Unlike the panel in TSPC I, the TSPC H panel held that
"ripeness did not require the plaintiffs to ask TRPA to amend the 1984 Plan before
bringing their claims." Id. The TSPC H court declined to follow the contrary ruling in
TSPC I because it was not accompanied by a "definitive rationale." Id.
66. Id. at 156-57.
67. TSPC, 808 F. Supp. 1474, 1478 (D. Nev. 1992).
68. Id. at 1483.
69. See id. at 1481. The court dismissed the claims relating to the 1984 Plan
because of the intervening injunction, which "prevented the 1984 plan from ever
taking effect." It explained, "TSPC's taking challenge to the 1984 Regional Plan must
fail because that plan was enjoined and never implemented, hence the requisite
causation between the 1984 Plan and TSPC's purported injury is lacking as a matter
of law." Id. Although the plaintiffs urged the court to follow the reasoning of TSPC
H rather than TSPC I, the court declined to do so:
[T]his Court chooses to follow the law-of-the-case doctrine. Despite the
inconsistency of the Appellate Court rulings, the per curium opinion in
TSPC I dismissed the claims. This Court is not free to disregard the ruling in
TSPC I that ripeness standards preclude the Nevada plaintiffs from pursuing
a takings claim pertaining to the 1984 Regional Plan.
Id. at 1478.
70. TSPC III, 34 F.3d 753, 755-56 (1994).
71. Id. at 756.
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district court, which now seemed bound to consider the substance of
the Council's takings claims.
3. TSPC IV: The District Court Finally Finds a Taking
Despite the Ninth Circuit's reversal and remand, the Nevada
district court was not quite ready to let a trial go forward. Instead, it
decided to take another look at the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
TRPA could raise no more statute of limitations defenses. In a
decision that inverts the normal judicial hierarchy, the district court
concluded that the Ninth Circuit's preclusion of new limitations
defenses was "clearly erroneous."72 It therefore allowed TRPA to
assert California's and Nevada's statutes of limitations for Section
1983 actions, which require such claims to be brought within one year
and two years, respectively. The court was then able to dismiss the
landowners' takings claims with respect to the 1987 Plan, since the
Council did not specifically challenge that plan until 1991. 71
Finally, the district court held an 11-day bench trial on the Council's
few remaining claims. Perhaps surprisingly, given its record up to this
point, the court concluded that, under substantive takings law, the
plaintiffs had indeed suffered a compensable confiscation of their
property.74 Specifically, it held that the temporary development ban
implemented by Ordinance 81-5 effected a taking of the SEZ and
class 1-3 California land by preventing all economically viable use of
these areas.75 It additionally held that "all plaintiffs, on both sides of
the Basin, are entitled to compensation" for the period in which
Resolution 83-21 was in effect because it too deprived the relevant
landowners of all economically viable use of their property.76 Finally,
it again rejected the takings claims arising from the 1984 Plan on the
ground that the 1984 injunction prevented the Plan from ever going
into effect.77 This decision prompted both parties to appeal to the
Ninth Circuit for the fourth time.
III. THE LAST NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OPINION AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT'S RESPONSE
In TSPC IV,7  the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion that the 1984 and 1987 Plan did not cause a taking, but
72. TSPC, 992 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (D. Nev. 1998).
73. TSPC III, 34 F.3d at 755.
74. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1251-55 (D. Nev. 1999).
75. Id. at 1243-45.
76. Id. at 1245.
77. Id. at 1245-48.
78. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 2000). The court also considered
whether (1) the injunction against the 1984 Regional Plan precluded TSPC from
acquiring a cognizable takings claim arising from the 1984 Plan and (2) TSPC takings
claims related to the 1987 plan were time-barred.
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reversed the award of compensation arising from the moratoria. The
latter issue is the focus of the opinion and the Supreme Court's
subsequent grant of certiorari. Writing for the unanimous panel,
Judge Reinhardt agreed with the district court that the moratorium's
constitutionality hinged on the application of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council and, more specifically, the rule that a taking occurs
when a regulation denies a landowner "all economically beneficial
and productive use of... land."79  However, Reinhardt contended
that the inquiry required an a priori and closer look into the nature
and extent of the property interest to which the economically
beneficial use standard would apply."0 His novel approach to the
relevant parcel issue would ultimately cut the legs out from under the
district court's application of Lucas and, when affirmed by the
Supreme Court, alter the constitutional and conceptual terrain
surrounding takings challenges to temporary land use restrictions.
A. The Fundamentals of the Ninth Circuit's Decision
1. The Ninth Circuit Extends the Relevant Temporal Framework
In TSPC IV, Judge Reinhardt altered the focus of the Tahoe
dispute from the impact of TRPA's moratorium during its effective
period to its impact over the entire useful life of the subject
properties, proclaiming that
[P]iaintiffs' argument is that [the court] should conceptually sever
each plaintiff's fee interest into discrete segments in at least one of
these dimensions-the temporal one-and treat each of those
segments as separate and distinct property interests for purposes of
takings analysis. Under this theory, they argue that there was a
categorical taking of one of those temporal segments.8'
In Reinhardt's view, this argument (which was never overtly
advanced by the Council) led to the incorrect conclusion that the
moratorium caused a compensable denial of all use of property. It did
so by proposing too narrow a conception of the relevant time period
in which to measure the impact of the moratorium, one that did not
correspond to Supreme Court decisions admonishing courts to look to
"the [claimant's] parcel as a whole" when considering a regulatory
takings claim. 2 Stressing that property ownership has a "temporal,"
79. Id. at 773 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1015 (1992)).
80. See id. at 774. The court stated, "[Flor purposes of determining whether a
'taking' of the plaintiff's 'property' has occurred, the proper inquiry is what
constitutes the relevant 'property'? Is it the fee interest that must be 'taken,' or is it
some lesser unit of property?" Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 775.
For example, the dimensions of a property interest may include a physical
dimension (which describes the size and shape of the property in question), a
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as well as spatial dimension, Reinhardt essentially concluded that the
court should look at the "temporal whole," that is, the indefinite
useful life of real property, when considering whether the moratorium
denied all economic use of the Council's parcels.83
To justify expansion of the temporal size of the Council's property,
Reinhardt claimed that "[a] planning regulation that prevents the
development of a parcel for a temporary period of time is
conceptually no different than a land-use restriction that permanently
denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or that permanently
restricts a type of use across all of the parcel." 4 In each case, the
landowner suffers a similar loss of overall property value and should
therefore have a similar right to compensation." Finally, he raised the
specter that the court would convert all temporary moratoria into
takings if it accepted the notion that temporary restrictions can be
viewed in isolation for takings purposes. 6 In light of the many public
benefits he associated with planning moratoria,87 Reinhardt made it
clear that he would interpret the law to avoid that result.88
The TSPC IV decision quickly dismissed any suggestion that
aggregation of temporal interests was contrary to established Supreme
Court precedent. The first, and most important, potential barrier was
functional dimension (which describes the extent to which an owner may use
or dispose of the property in question), and a temporal dimension (which
describes the duration of the property interest).
Id. at 774.
83. Id. at 776-77.
84. Id. at 776 (citing Radin, supra note 17, at 1674-78).
85. Id. at 776-77.
86. Id. at 777.
87. Id. In a summary that could have come from a TRPA training manual, the
court extolled the virtues of development moratoria:
Land-use planning is necessarily a complex, time-consuming undertaking for
a community, especially in a situation as unique as this. In several ways,
temporary development moratoria promote effective planning. First, by
preserving the status quo during the planning process, temporary moratoria
ensure that a community's problems are not exacerbated during the time it
takes to formulate a regulatory scheme. Relatedly, temporary development
moratoria prevent developers and landowners from racing to carry out
development that is destructive of the community's interests before a new
plan goes into effect. Such a race-to-development would permit property
owners to evade the land-use plan and undermine its goals. Finally, the
breathing room provided by temporary moratoria helps ensure that the
planning process is responsive to the property owners and citizens who will
be affected by the resulting land-use regulations. Absent the pressure of
trying to out-speed developers who are attempting to circumvent the
planning goals, the planning and implementation process may be permitted
to run its full and natural course with widespread citizen input and
involvement, public debate, and full consideration of all issues and points of
view.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. ("Given the importance and long-standing use [of] temporary moratoria,
courts should be exceedingly reluctant to adopt rulings that would threaten the
survival of this crucial planning mechanism.").
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the Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles.89 The district court had concluded
that the reasoning in First English compelled it to treat temporary
denials of all economic use in the same manner as permanent
denials.9" This reading was, however, "flatly incorrect," according to
Judge Reinhardt.91 In Reinhardt's view, First English merely required
payment of compensation when an excessive permanent regulation is
judicially "invalidated."92 As a result, First English was inapplicable
to development moratoria, "which from the outset are designed to last
for only a limited period of time," and did not support the Council's
attempt to isolate the three-year period during which they were
denied all use of their property. 93
Reinhardt subsequently rejected the suggestion that temporal
severance was supported by several World War II-era Supreme Court
cases requiring compensation for the temporary confiscation of
leaseholds.94 In contrast to the district court, the Ninth Circuit found
those cases irrelevant to the Council's claims against TRPA's
temporary building ban.95  The reason was simple. The property
owners in the World War II decisions were forced to submit to a
"physical invasion" of property by government, while the Council had
merely suffered a deprivation of all use.96 Claiming (incorrectly) that
physical invasion cases have always been treated differently than
regulatory takings cases, the panel declared that World War II cases
requiring compensation for a temporary occupation of property had
"no bearing" on the Council's situation.97 It therefore concluded that
there was nothing to prevent it from looking to the "whole [temporal]
parcels of property that the plaintiffs own" in determining if a taking
occurred. 98
89. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
90. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1250 (D. Nev. 1999).
91. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2000).
92. Id. at 778.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 778-79. The World War II-era cases at issue were United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) and United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373 (1945).
95. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 779.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court first drew a clear distinction between physical
and regulatory takings in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982), decided nearly forty years after the cases distinguished on this ground by
Judge Reinhardt.
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2. The Ninth Circuit Concludes that a Moratorium Cannot Cause a
Categorical Taking
Once it determined that the impact of the moratorium must be
weighed within an expansive temporal framework, the TSPC IV panel
considered whether that impact amounted to a denial of all beneficial
use of property within the meaning of Lucas.9 9  Noting that the
temporally limited construction ban "preserved the bulk of the future
developmental use of the property," Judge Reinhardt first concluded
that the moratorium did not eviscerate all of the present value of the
property.""° For the same reason, the moratorium did not deny all
"use" of the property.0" Consequently, the TSPC landowners were
not deprived of "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land," regardless of whether that standard was interpreted to mean
that the government must allow property to retain some value or
some use.'02 Therefore, like the 1984 Plan and the 1987 plan,103 the
moratorium did not cause a compensable taking of private property.
The Ninth Circuit later refused, over a strong dissent by Judge
99. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 779-82.
100. Id. at 781.
101. Id. at 782.
The "use" of the plaintiffs' property runs from the present to the future.
(This is a simple corollary of our earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs'
property interests may not be temporally severed.) By instituting a
temporary development moratorium, TRPA denied the plaintiffs only a
small portion of this future stream; the thirty-two months during which the
moratorium was in effect represents a small fraction of the useful life of the
Tahoe properties.
Id.
102. Id.
103. After snatching away the Council's brief victory on its 1981-84 takings claims,
the Ninth Circuit moved on to consider whether the district court was correct in
rejecting the claims (of the Californians) arising from the 1984 Regional Plan on the
theory that the injunction precluded the Plan's implementation. Id. at 783-85.
Upholding the rationale of the lower court, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the argument
that the 1984 Plan was the legal cause of the Council's losses during 1984-87 by simply
finding that plan had not gone into effect due to the injunction. Id. at 784.
Additionally, the court held that TRPA was not liable for a taking under the 1984
Plan by causing the injunction to issue because it could have neither foreseen nor
prevented that event. Id. at 785. In considering the 1987 Plan, the appellate panel was
faced with the district court's decision to dismiss the Council's claims based on new
statute of limitations defenses, in contravention of the Ninth Circuit's own command
to deny all such defenses. Although the panel indicated that the district court may
have been within its rights in refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit, it refused to decide
when a lower court may substitute its judgment for that of a higher tribunal. Id. at
786-87. Instead, it invoked its own authority to refuse to follow the earlier Ninth
Circuit ruling (barring new statute of limitations defenses) because such a bar was
"clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice." Id. The
panel then simply adopted the district court's conclusion that the 1987 claims were
barred by California's and Nevada's statutes of limitations for section 1983 actions.
Id. at 787-88.
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Kozinski, to rehear the case en banc. 114 After 16 years of litigation,
the landowners' only hope of receiving any compensation for their
losses rested with the United States Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion and Its Impact on Regulatory Takings
Law
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether
a moratorium causes a categorical taking despite its temporary
nature," 5 a narrow issue that the Court raised on its own initiative.
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Stevens affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that Lucas does not apply to a moratorium. In so doing,
the Court adopted much of the Ninth Circuit's rationale, while adding
the important qualification that intentionally temporary restrictions
may cause a taking under the standards set out in Penn Central as well
as under other relevant federal takings standards.1 6
1. The Court Affirms the Ninth Circuit's View of the Relevant Parcel
and Its Effect on Lucas
The Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra began, and to a large extent
ended, when the Court decided that the "parcel as a whole" indeed
applies in the temporal context, thus requiring future property uses to
be taken into account when reviewing whether a moratorium causes a
taking. 7 As in the Ninth Circuit, this logic inexorably led the Court to
the conclusion that a temporary moratorium on property use cannot
cause a per se taking -under Lucas' denial of all economically
beneficial use rule. The Court put it this way:
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that
describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest.... Both
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in its
104. TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
105. 121 S. Ct. 2589, 2589-90 (2001). The precise issue on certiorari was, "Whether
the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land
development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?"
106. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1486 (2002).
107. See id. at 1483-84 (2002). The Court stated that petitioner's argument against
temporal aggregation is
unavailing because it ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory
takings cases we must focus on "the parcel as a whole."..... Thus, the District
Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners' property into temporal
segments corresponding to the [moratoria] regulations at issue and then
analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically viable use
during each period. The starting point for the Court's analysis should have
been to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then
Penn Central was the proper framework.
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entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner's use of the
entire area is a taking of "the parcel as a whole," whereas a
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is not.
Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless [within
the meaning of Lucas] by a temporary prohibition on economic use,
because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is
lifted."
In so reasoning, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that First English does not bar the aggregation of temporal interests.
Instead, the Court agreed that First English addresses only the
required remedy for a taking. °9 Similarly, because the regulation at
issue in Lucas was "permanent," a feature necessary for a complete
denial of all economically beneficial use of property,"0 Lucas' per se
takings rule applied only to a "permanent" takings claim."' Given
this framework, the Court perceived the question in Tahoe-Sierra to
be whether it should recognize a new per se rule for temporary
deprivations of all economically beneficial uses of property." 12
Invoking the image of ordinary building delays rendered
constitutionally uncertain"3 and the attendant burden on government
planning,"4 the Court refused to adopt a categorical rule for
temporary use deprivations or a "narrower rule that excluded the
normal delays associated with processing permits, or that covered only
delays of more than a year.""' 5 Instead, the Court drew heavily from
108. Id. at 1484.
109. Id. at 1482 ("[OJur decision in First English surely did not approve, and
implicitly rejected, the categorical submission [that a temporary denial of all use is a
taking without more] that petitioners are now advocating.").
110. Id. at 1483-84.
111. Id. at 1483 ("[W]e decided the [Lucas] case on the permanent taking theory
that both the trial court and the State Supreme Court had addressed.").
112. See id. at 1478 ("For petitioners it is enough that a regulation imposes a
temporary deprivation-no matter how brief-of all economically viable use to
trigger a per se rule that a taking has occurred . . . ."); id. at 1485 ("[Tlhe extreme
categorical rule that any deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief,
constitutes a compensable taking surely cannot be sustained.").
113. See id. at 1485 ("Petitioners' broad submission would apply to numerous
'normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like,' as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes,
businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other areas that we
cannot now foresee." (citation omitted)).
114. Id. ("A rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of property
would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage
hasty decision making.").
115. Id. at 1486-87. The Court noted that while a narrower rule
would certainly have a less severe impact on prevailing [government]
practices, .... it would still impose serious financial constraints on the
planning process. Unlike the "extraordinary circumstance" in which the
government deprives a property owner of all economic use, moratoria...
are used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo while
formulating a more permanent development strategy.... Yet even the weak
version of petitioners' categorical rule would treat these interim measures as
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Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island..6
in holding that what is required is the more fact-specific inquiry
inherent in the multi-factor approach of Penn Central."7 Elaborating
on the contours of the Penn Central approach, the Court stressed that
the temporary duration of a restriction is a single factor in the
analysis "8 and that if other factors-such as a landowner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations-pointed toward a taking, a
temporary moratorium can rise to the level of taking despite its short
duration. " 9  In this regard, the court carefully noted that the
temporary moratorium at issue in Tahoe-Sierra may have caused a
taking under Penn Central.220 However, since the Council had failed
to raise such a claim in its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Court
refused definitively to resolve the question or to remand the case to
the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Penn
Central.'21
2. Tahoe-Sierra's Impact Is as Narrow as the Scope of the Question
Tahoe-Sierra is significant for clarifying that Lucas does not reach
temporary moratoria, but as an elucidation of takings law in general,
the decision is something of a disappointment. Perhaps the most
remarkable statement is that First English does not establish the
constitutional equivalency of temporary and permanent regulations.2 2
takings regardless of the good faith of the planners, the reasonable
expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact of the moratorium on
property values.
Id. (citations omitted).
116. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
117. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1486 ("[F]or reasons set out at some length by
Justice O'CONNOR in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo... we are persuaded that
the better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking
'requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances."').
118. Id. at 1486 ("In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not hold that the
temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we
simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the
other.").
119. Id. at 1489.
In our view, the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors
that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim, but
with respect to that factor as with respect to other factors, the "temptation to
adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted."
There may be moratoria that last longer than one year which interfere with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, but... petitioners' proposed
rule is simply "too blunt an instrument," for identifying those cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1478 n.16 ("It may be true that under a Penn Central analysis
petitioners' land was taken and compensation would be due.").
121. See id. at 1485.
122. See id. at 1482, 1484 (discussing First English and concluding that it does not
support the notion that all temporary deprivations of use are compensable).
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But this clarification should have few ramifications beyond the
context of avowedly temporary regulations such as moratoria. This is
because the immediate result of the re-characterization of First
English-the adoption of the "temporal whole" theory-has little
relevance to a regulation that lacks an expressly finite duration.123
Without a sunset provision, regulations are considered permanent
and, absent strategic and bad faith utilization of the "temporary" label
on the part of regulators and legislatures,'24 will continue to fall within
the ambit of the economically beneficial use rule articulated in
Lucas.'25
The Tahoe-Sierra opinion vacillates between discussing the Lucas
rule in terms of a loss of physical property use and a complete
elimination of property value.'26 But none of the Court's references to
property value should be read as a groundbreaking holding that the
"all economically beneficial... use" test is only satisfied by the
elimination of all value. 27 On the contrary, when read carefully, the
Court's opinion simply confirms the unremarkable proposition that an
elimination of all value is one circumstance that triggers a taking under
the use-based Lucas rule. As the Court explained,
The categorical rule that we applied in Lucas states that
compensation is required when a regulation deprives an owner of
"all economically beneficial uses" of his land. Under that rule, a
statute that "wholly eliminated the value" of Lucas' fee simple title
clearly qualified as a taking. But our holding was limited to "the
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted.' 121
Post-Tahoe-Sierra takings cases continue to describe the per se
takings rule in terms of economic use, and therefore confirm that
Tahoe-Sierra's treatment of Lucas says nothing new about the
character or reach of the "all economically beneficial use" rule, except
123. See id. at 1482-84 (distinguishing regulatory challenges requiring temporal
aggregation from the "permanent deprivation of the owner's use" of property in
Lucas).
124. See infra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
125. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482-83.
126. See id. at 1482-84, 1487.
127. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Tahoe-Sierra suggests that he read
the majority opinion as having recast Lucas in terms of value. Id. at 1493 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). However, the Tahoe-Sierra decision shows that courts should resist
relying too much on dissenting opinions when trying to interpret unclear sections of a
majority decision. After all, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in First English reads
as if the majority opinion in that case established the equivalency, for takings analysis,
of permanent and temporary regulations. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1619 (1988) ("Stevens wrote as though the majority unambiguously bought
into a general doctrine of conceptual severance by timeshares."). Yet, Tahoe-Sierra
clarified this was not a correct reading of First English.
128. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (italicized "no" in original; other italics
added).
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that it does not apply to moratoria.129 Therefore, to understand the
scope of the economically beneficial use rule and more specifically,
the role of property value in that rule, one must continue to look first
and foremost to the opinion in Lucas itself. And while Lucas is not
clear about the exact point at which retained property value takes a
case out of the categorical rule's orbit,130 it is at least clear about when
it does not; i.e., when that value flows from economically non-viable
salvage uses, such as personal recreation uses,' or arises from a piece
of property required to be left "substantially in its natural state.'
3 2
Dicta'33 in Tahoe-Sierra pertaining to Lucas does nothing to disturb
this bottom line, especially in light of the Court's careful admonition
129. See Blue Ribbon Props., Inc. v. Hardin County, No. 00-6345, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16714, at *14 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2002) (rejecting takings claim under Lucas
because "Blue Ribbon has received an annual income from the property through
agricultural and billboard leases, there is [saleable] timber on the property.., and
some of the land is suitable for farming"); Barefoot v. City of Wilmington, Nos. 01-
1185, 01-2191, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 11106, at *20 (4th Cir. June 10, 2002) (citing
Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra for the proposition that "regulations that deny all
economically beneficial and productive use of land are compensable takings");
Currier Builders, Inc. v. Town of York, No. 01-68-PC, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9942, at
*28 (D. Me. May 30, 2002) (stating that "when the owner is deprived of any
economically viable use of his property, no further inquiry is necessary" and holding
that the ability to build residential homes satisfied this test); Mays v. Bd. of Trs. of
Miami Township, No. 18997, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3347, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 28, 2002) (citing Tahoe-Sierra for the propositions that: "A 'taking'... may be
accomplished through a regulation that prohibits a use of land. In order to [do so] the
measure involved must be permanent in nature and of such a character and effect that
the owner is deprived of all or substantially all economic use of his land that is
feasible.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted). But see McPherson Landfill, Inc. v.
Shawnee County, No. 88,075, 2002 Kan. LEXIS 457, at *55 (Kan. July 12, 2002).
130. See infra notes 230-37 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Steel v. Cape Corp., 677 A.2d 634 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). There,
the court considered whether property zoned "OS" (Open Space) retained economic
viability. Permissible uses included "general recreational uses which preserve and
protect the natural environment," along with "temporary structures for boating,
swimming, fishing, hunting," and other recreational pursuits. Id. at 637.
Notwithstanding the availability of these recreational uses, the court concluded that
"the uses permitted in OS-zoned districts do not include any viable economic uses" as
that term is used in Lucas. Id. at 649. The key for the court was the fact that OS
zoning "permits no development." Id.
132. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
(observing that the typical way that regulations leave a landowner without
economically beneficial use is "by requiring land to be left substantially in its natural
state"); Currier Builders, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9942 at *20.
133. Any language appearing to stress the relevance of value in the context of
Lucas was unnecessary to the ultimate conclusion that Lucas did not apply to a
temporary moratorium. Once the "whole parcel" framework applies to the temporal
dimension of property, a temporary property restriction escapes the per se takings
rule under a traditional use-based interpretation because including the (regulation-
free) future in the takings analysis necessarily leads to the determination that a
temporary restriction does not deny all property use and therefore leaves the property
with some value. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 782 (1994).
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about the "narrow scope of [its] holding" '134 and Palazzolo's recent
declaration that a "token interest" cannot satisfy Lucas.'35
Tahoe-Sierra reaffirmed the status quo in other aspects of takings
law as well. In particular, the Court indicated that a landowner may
still claim a taking under the theory that a regulation fails to
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest,"'36 or that an agency
has acted in bad faith so as to delay a development.'37
Additionally, the Court stressed the continuing relevance of
"reasonable investment-backed expectations," and other Penn Central
factors in cases where a landowner is not permanently deprived of all
economically beneficial use of land.'38 Finally, the Court exhorted
lower courts to persist in considering basic issues of fairness when
considering whether a landowner should alone bear the burden of a
land use regulation. 3 9 Unfortunately, the Court could not apply any
of these criteria in Tahoe-Sierra because of the procedural posture in
which the dispute over TRPA's actions came to the Court. 140
To the extent that Tahoe-Sierra sheds light on the direction of
takings law in general, the big winner is Penn Central and, as discussed
more fully in the following section, the loser is the conventional
134. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1470 (2002) ("Although the question we decide
relates only to that 32-month period [of the moratoria], a brief description of the
events leading up to the moratoria and a comment on the two permanent plans that
TRPA adopted thereafter will clarify the narrow scope of our holding." (emphasis
added)).
135. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) ("[A] State may not evade
the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with a token
interest.").
136. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1485 ("[A]part from the District Court's finding
that TRPA's actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm to
the lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest .... (citing Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 700-02 (1999))). In light of this statement, the
suggestion by some commentators that Agins' substantial advancement test is not
viable as an independent takings standard must be viewed with considerable
skepticism. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Does Regulation that Fails to Advance a
Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 Envtl. L. Rep.
853 (1999); Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy and Operation
of the Agins Tests, in Taking Sides, supra note 7; Glen E. Summers, Private Property
Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by Substantive Due
Process, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837 (1993). This is especially true given that state courts
continue to find that a compensable taking results when government fails to meet the
substantial advancement test. See, e.g., State ex. rel Shemo v. City of Mayfield
Heights, 765 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002).
137. See Tahoe-Sierra 122 S. Ct. at 1485. ("[W]ere it not for the findings of the
District Court that TRPA acted diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded
that the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environmental
threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated by the 1980 Compact."
(citing Monterey, 526 U.S. at 698)).
138. Id. at 1489.
139. Id. at 1486.
140. Id. at 1485.
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understanding of the majority opinion in First English. As a result,
temporary takings continue to exist, but, if they are to arise from a
temporary regulation such as a moratorium, must be found under the
ad-hoc balancing approach, not the categorical formulation.141 This
gives a boost to an expansive definition for the amorphous "parcel as
a whole" construct, but only in temporal dimension; Tahoe-Sierra is
silent with respect to the dimensions of the spatial "parcel as a whole,"
a relevant parcel issue that is much more common to the ordinary
permanent takings claim and which remains unresolved.142
In the final analysis, Tahoe-Sierra will be remembered as a case that
refused to push the Court's recent preference for bright lines into the
moratoria arena. 143 Yet, because of its limited scope and the Court's
recognition that takings law affords a number of potential remedies,
the decision tends to affirm a status quo that is generally attentive to
the constitutional rights of property owners as a class, if not to the
particular property owners who initiated and ultimately lost the case.
Still, even within its narrow confines, the Court's opinion is difficult to
reconcile with previous takings cases, such as First English and Lucas,
that seem to suggest that draconian restrictions must be viewed for
what they are, not what they might be in the future and which,
therefore, arguably point to a different result in Tahoe-Sierra.
IV. THE UNEASY FIT BETWEEN TAHOE-SIERRA AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S PREVIOUS TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
In Tahoe-Sierra, both the Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court advanced an extremely narrow view of the majority
opinion in First English, while simultaneously adhering to an
expansive view of cases describing the relevant takings parcel as the
"parcel as a whole." This selective construction of case law led to the
adoption of the "temporal whole" parcel theory which inevitably
renders a per se rule in the vein of Lucas' economically beneficial use
rule inapplicable to moratoria and similarly temporary restrictions. In
short, the Tahoe-Sierra decision rests within the Supreme Court's
prior takings jurisprudence only through an innovative and
controversial interpretation of several of the Court's most important
takings decisions, a point emphatically made by Judge Kozinski's
dissent to denial of rehearing en banc in the Ninth Circuit decision?
44
141. See id. at 1486. ("[Tlhe better approach to claims that a regulation has effected
a temporary taking 'requires careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances."' (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
142. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (noting the Court's "discomfort" with an
undefined "parcel as a whole" framework); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (acknowledging "uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator").
143. See, e.g., Chris Scheuring, Categorical Rule Rejected For Temporary Moratoria
Takings, L. A. Daily J., May 3, 2002, at Al.
144. See TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
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A. Tahoe-Sierra Does Not Sit Well With the First English Majority
Opinion
The idea that a temporary regulation, particularly one that denies
all use, can cause a taking has been relatively uncontroversial ever
since the Court's 1987 decision in First English.'45 However, in Tahoe-
Sierra, Justice Stevens adopted an interpretation of First English that
seems inconsistent with significant portions of the opinion of the
majority. 4 ' While some confusion over the scope of First English is
understandable, given the imprecise language in the opinion, the
construction advanced by the Supreme Court (and for that matter, the
Ninth Circuit) is uncomfortably similar to Stevens' own dissenting
opinion in First English.
The dispute in First English arose when-after governmental cloud
seeding-heavy rain and a resulting flood destroyed a church's retreat
center and a recreational area for handicapped children in a rural area
of Los Angeles County.147 The episode prompted the county to enact
denial of rehearing en banc) ("The panel does not like the Supreme Court's Takings
Clause jurisprudence very much, so it reverses First English ... and adopts Justice
Stevens's First English dissent."); id. at 1002 ("[The panel] must pretend First English
said nothing relevant to this case. And so the panel does, claiming that First English
does not address whether a temporary moratorium is a taking, because it was 'not
even a case about what constitutes a taking."' (citation omitted)).
145. See, e.g., Bernard H. Siegan, Property and Freedom 125 (1997) (noting that
under First English, "[tihe owner is entitled to just compensation for a temporary
taking from the date the offending ordinance is adopted until the date that the
ordinance is either rescinded or altered so that it no longer affects a taking of the
property"); Wendie L. Kellington, Temporary Takings/Moratoria at 5, ALI-ABA
Course of Study Materials, Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain, and
Compensation (Aug. 2001) (stating that the "lesson" from First English is that
"[a]doption of temporary regulations that deprive a property owner of all
economically beneficial use warrant compensation in the same manner that
compensation would be owed if the regulations were permanent"); Joseph LaRusso,
"Paying For the Change:" First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles and the Calculation of Interim Damages for Regulatory
Takings, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev. 551, 570 (1990) ("The First English holding
confirmed that a majority of the Court still approved of Justice Brennan's position
regarding damages for temporary takings, including his definition of the compensable
interim period as the interval during which the taking was effective."); Jon Lycett,
Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission: Why Temporary Takings Law is
"Screwed Up," 7 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 55, 65 (2000) (noting that First
English "means the government must pay a fair rental value for the interest taken for
whatever time the regulation is in place"); Comment: Putting the Cart Before the
Horse: Just Compensation For Regulatory Takings in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989)
(noting that the First English Court found that "permanent, physical takings were not
different 'in kind' from temporary, regulatory takings, and the compensation was to
be calculated in the same manner regardless of the character of the state's action").
146. For a detailed comparison of the Ninth Circuit's TSPC IV opinion and First
English, see Berger, Taking Sides, supra note 7.
147. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 307-08 (1987).
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a temporary moratorium on all construction within the flood area.'48
When the church realized it was prohibited from rebuilding, it sued
the county, claiming that it was owed compensation for the period in
which the regulation denied it all use of its property.'49 The California
courts rejected this claim, holding that the church's only remedy was
to have the regulation invalidated.15 °
The Supreme Court subsequently heard the case to determine
"whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the government to
pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."'' The Court ultimately held
"where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all
use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it
of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective."' 152
The only exceptions to this rule were in the case of "normal delays
in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances,
and the like."' 53 Therefore, operating under the assumption that the
Los Angeles County construction ban had indeed denied all use of the
church's property "for a considerable period of years," the court
concluded that "invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair
value for the use of the property during this period of time would be a
constitutionally insufficient remedy. '154
1. Understanding the Scope of First English
From the outset, let's be clear that First English is not a case about
what particular acts of government constitute a taking,'55 and thus
does not stand for the proposition that a temporary building
moratorium is a taking. 56 The church appealed to the Supreme Court
not because a California appellate court had rejected their takings
claim on the merits (it hadn't), but because it held that compensation
148. Id. at 307.
149. Id. at 308.
150. Id. at 308-09. The California trial court and Court of Appeals relied on Agins
v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Ca. 1979), aff'd in part, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), which held that
"compensation [for a taking] is not required until the challenged regulation or
ordinance has been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a writ of
mandamus and the government has nevertheless decided to continue the regulation in
effect." First English, 482 U.S. at 308-09.
151. First English, 482 U.S. at 313.
152. Id. at 321.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 322.
155. Id. at 313 ("We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance
at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the county might
avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the
denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety
regulations.").
156. Id. at 311("The disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial
question for our consideration.").
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was unavailable as a remedy for a regulatory taking. 5 7 This holding
was based on Agins v. Tiburon,5 ' a case in which the California
Supreme Court held that invalidation of an offending regulation,
rather than compensation, was the only constitutional remedy for a
regulatory deprivation of private property.15 9 In four previous cases,
the Supreme Court flirted with the chance to address the Agins rule,
but backed off each time for procedural reasons. 60 The plaintiffs in
First English were asking the Court to consider the Agins rule once
more. '6 Therefore, as the Tahoe-Sierra Court correctly noted, First
English is largely about whether compensation is the proper remedy
for a regulatory taking. 62
However, it is difficult to pigeonhole First English as a case that
merely overrules Agins.163 This is because in answering the remedial
question, the Court makes several points that seem relevant to takings
analysis generally and to the scrutiny of temporary property
restrictions in particular." The issue itself was broadly framed, at
least at one point, as follows: "[W]hether abandonment [of a
regulation] by the government requires payment of compensation for
the period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all use
of his land. '' 65
If this summarizes the question before the Court, First English
logically encompasses the specific question of the timing of
compensatory relief, as well as the underlying debate over whether
compensation or invalidation is the constitutional remedy for a
regulatory taking in general.
157. Id. at 312 (noting that the church's "claims were deemed irrelevant [by the
appellate court] solely because of the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins
that damages are unavailable to redress a 'temporary' regulatory taking").
158. 598 P.2d 26 (Cal. 1979).
159. See id. at 25.
160. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
161. First English, 482 U.S. at 310 ("Appellant asks us to hold that the California
Supreme Court erred in Agins v. Tiburon in determining that the Fifth
Amendment... does not require compensation as a remedy for 'temporary'
regulatory takings-those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the
courts.").
162. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1486 (2002); see also Thomas E. Roberts,
Moratoria as Categorical Regulatory Takings. What First English and Lucas Say and
Don't Say, 31 Envtl. L. Rep 11,037, 11,038 (2001) (arguing that "First English [m]erely
[r]esolved the [c]ompensation [v]ersus [i]nvalidation [d]ebate").
163. See Roberts, supra note 162.
164. See Steven J. Eagle, Development Moratoria, First English Principles, and
Regulatory Takings, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,232, at 11,232 (2001) ("In the course of
framing the appropriate remedy, First English said much about what constitutes a
temporary taking.").
165. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
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The majority later indicated that it had indeed intended to address
the narrower Agins question by focusing on the broader timing issue.
In particular it explained that "in considering this question [of
whether abandonment of a regulation denying all use requires
compensation]," the Court found "substantial guidance in cases where
the government has only temporarily exercised its right to use private
property," but has nevertheless been required to provide just
compensation. 166  If the Court had simply wanted to resolve the
compensation versus invalidation debate, it could have done so
without the focus on the cases involving temporary property
restrictions.167
Much of the remainder of the First English majority opinion also
seems to answer affirmatively the question whether excessive
temporary property restrictions require compensation. For instance,
in stressing that the government has been required to pay just
compensation when it abandons a physical occupation of property
that was originally intended to be permanent, the Court stated
"[tlhese cases reflect the fact that 'temporary' takings, which, as here,
deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind
from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires
compensation."168
Many lower courts have viewed this statement as a significant
indicator of the Court's thinking on temporary takings. 169 In First
English, the Court reinforced the implication that excessive temporary
and permanent restrictions are constitutionally equivalent by
comparing the church's regulatory takings claim to a claim for
166. Id. at 318.
167. For instance, the Court could have analogized solely to early permanent
physical invasion decisions that established the government's duty to compensate.
See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893).
168. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
169. See Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing
First English for the proposition that "[t]emporary takings are not different in kind
from permanent takings"); Poirier v. Grand Blanc Township, 423 N.W.2d 351, 353
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) ("'[T]emporary' takings.., are not different in kind from
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation")
(quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 317); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners
Ass'n v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 548 S.E.2d 595, 603 (S.C. 2001) (citing First English
for the proposition that "[t]emporary [regulatory] takings which ... deny a landowner
all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires Compensation" (quoting First English, 482 U.S. 318));
see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1033 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is well established that temporary takings are as
protected by the Constitution as permanent ones."); TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("First English
did decide that a temporary regulation is 'not different in kind' from a permanent
one: If either deprives the owner of all use of his property, the owner is entitled to
compensation."(citation omitted)).
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compensation due to government appropriation of a leasehold
interest:
The value of a leasehold interest in property for a period of years
may be substantial, and the burden on the property owner in
extinguishing such an interest for a period of years may be great
indeed. Where this burden results from governmental action that
amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment requires that the government pay the landowner for
the value of the use of the land during this period. Invalidation of
the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this period of time,
though converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not a
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation
Clause.17°
This passage suggests that a regulation may trigger the duty to
compensate, without regard to any potential future use or value of the
subject property. More specifically, by noting that compensation is
the remedy for the challenged temporary "ordinance" as well as any
"successor ordinance," it even implies that compensation is the
appropriate remedy in the case of an initial development moratorium
or, as in Tahoe-Sierra, in the case of a series of moratoria.17'
When viewed in light of First English's language and its analogies to
temporary physical takings, the Court's holding-that "where the
government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the
duty to pay compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective"'1 2 -seems to mean that a temporary compensable taking
results when a regulation that would otherwise amount to a taking if it
were permanent turns out to be of limited duration. 173 This was the
reading of the Lucas Court, which described First English as holding
that "temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the
Takings Clause.' 1 74 It was also the understanding of the dissenting
justices in First English, who complained that "the Court...
concludes that all ordinances which would constitute takings if
allowed to remain in effect permanently, necessarily also constitute
takings if they are in effect for only a limited period of time.' 1 75
Numerous post-First English state 176 and federal 7  courts have so read
First English.'78
170. First English, 482 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted).
171. See Poirier, 423 N.W.2d at 353 (noting that, for the First English Court, the
fact that "the regulation was an interim one ... did not preclude an award for
damages").
172. Id. at 353.
173. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 n.17 (1992).
174. See id. at 1012 (citing First English for the proposition that "temporary
deprivations of use are compensable under the Takings Clause").
175. First English, 482 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. See Steinbergh v. City of Cambridge, 604 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 n.6 (Mass. 1992)
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Therefore, if the First English opinion had ended with its holding,
there would seem to be little reason to debate whether the case is
useful for determining what type of land use restriction triggers a
temporary taking. However, the Court did not stop with the strict
holding; instead it went on to note that its decision addressed only the
"facts presented" and not "the case of normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the
like."179
While the Court's qualification muddies the holding in First
English, it does not necessarily, contrary to the opinion of some
courts,"' swallow it whole. 8 ' Certainly, the "normal delay" exception
("The United States Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment takings principles
concerning permanent takings are applicable to regulatory conduct that temporarily
denies a landowner all use of his property."); Eberle v. Dane County Board of
Adjustment, 595 N.W.2d 730, 737 (Wis. 1999) (citing First English for the proposition
that "just compensation is constitutionally required for 'temporary regulatory takings'
or regulatory takings which continue for only a temporary period of time"); see also
Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1209 (Cal. 1998) (Brown,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he essential meaning of both Lucas and First Lutheran
[sic]-is that a final decision by a regulatory agency that denies all economically
beneficial use of property, even temporarily, is a per se compensable Fifth
Amendment taking"(emphasis in original)).
177. See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir.
1997) ("[I]f the regulation serves a valid public purpose, yet still goes so far in
diminishing the landowner's interests as to constitute a taking, just compensation may
be awarded running from the regulation's effective date."); Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v.
United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[A] taking, even for a day, without
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."); Callaway Community Hosp. v.
Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 693, 698 (W.D. Mo. 1992) ("[T]emporary, regulatory takings
may require just compensation."); Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park
Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 708 F.Supp. 1477, 1483 n.6 (W.D. Va. 1989) ("This
court notes that the opinion of the Supreme Court in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church effectively prevents defendants from relying on Agins to argue that
the temporary nature of the interference with the use of property in question removes
it from the category of a taking." (citation omitted)).
178. But see Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1073 n.4 (11th Cir.
1996) (finding First English applicable only where the challenged regulation is
indefinite in duration); Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d
258, 262 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("The apparent reach of First English is to
retrospectively temporary takings (e.g., regulations subsequently rescinded or
declared invalid), not prospectively temporary regulations such as the...
moratorium.").
179. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
180. See, e.g., Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1203-04 (holding that the time it takes
successfully to mount and conclude a legal challenge to a government agency's
mistaken assertion of jurisdiction is a normal delay that could not amount to a
temporary taking, even though all use of property was prohibited during the effective
period of the illegal assertion); Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Township of Warren, 777
A.2d 344 (N.J. 2001) ("[W]e see no distinction justifying the need to provide for
interim monetary damages between regulatory delay in securing a change in, or
variance from, a zoning ordinance and delay occasioned by resort to judicial processes
to challenge application of a zoning ordinance to one's property."). By extending the
"normal delay" exception to include the period of judicial challenge to regulations
that deny all use of property, these decisions effectively reinstate the Agins rule that
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suggests that some land use restrictions cannot be viewed in isolation
for takings purposes. But, as Professor Eagle points out, this principle
should be reserved for a relatively small class of regulations:
It is important to note that Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court in First English, did not refer to "questions that would arise in
the case of normal delays in land use regulation," or "normal delays
in the planning process." Instead, he used the phrase "normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances and the like." The strong implication here is that the
exception for "normal delays" is a narrow one. It implicitly seems to
apply to (1) the attempt by an owner, (2) with respect to his or her
parcel, to (3) obtain relief clearly contemplated by existing
procedures for administrative discretion or ordinance
modifications. 182
The limited "normal delay" exception implies, consistent with First
English's underlying holding, that some temporary restrictions are
amenable to a takings claim. The critical question is, of course, which
ones? Here, it should be important that the First English opinion
repeatedly highlights "interim Ordinance No. 11,855"-the
moratorium that prohibited the church from rebuilding on its land-as
the relevant regulatory fact, even though a permanent ordinance was
enacted between the time the church sued and the Court's review of
the case.'83 This suggests that when the Court contrasts the "normal
delay" exceptions to the "facts presented," it is implying that
temporary regulations are subject to the same scrutiny as permanent
restrictions. Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly specify its
meaning in this regard.
Assuming that the "normal delay" exception refers to reasonable
delays arising out of existing land use procedures, 8 4 the Court's
qualified holding could also be interpreted to apply to unreasonable
delays occasioned by a breakdown of that process, of which extended
and draconian moratoria are a prime example.'85 There are good
invalidation is sufficient to remedy a temporary taking. They therefore directly
contradict the majority holding in First English. See Eberle, 595 N.W.2d at 742 n.25("We also point out that the argument of the majority in Landgate was clearly
considered and rejected by the United States Supreme Court in First English because
Justice Stevens made the same argument in his dissenting opinion in First English.").
181. See Eberle, 595 N.W.2d at 742 n.25 (rejecting as "without merit" the argument
that "the period in which the permit denial allegedly deprived [the landowners] of the
use of their land [was] a mere 'delay', rather than a 'taking."').
182. Eagle, supra note 164, at 11,234-35 (emphasis added).
183. First English, 482 U.S. at 307, 312-13.
184. See Roberts, supra note 162, at 11,042 (noting that the "import of the 'normal
delay' language ... is that property owners must bear delay occasioned by reasonable
governmental decision making processes").
185. See Eagle, supra note 164, at 11,236 n.65 (stating that "a useful guide forjudicial construction of what constitutes a reasonable period for consideration of a
development application is the fact that many states have permit streamlining acts
that deem projects approved by operation of law if not acted upon within a specified
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practical reasons for so limiting the First English decision. Delays
occasioned by a moratorium are qualitatively different from those
arising from a permitting process since the initiation of a permit
process often does not effect any land use other than that applied for
and ultimately presumes that a permit will be granted if all the
prerequisites are met. 86 On the other hand, a moratorium completely
halts the permitting process, foreclosing for a period, any chance for
approval of specific uses, typically those related to construction.
Additionally, as Tahoe-Sierra clearly shows, such a ban may indirectly
preclude most or all other viable uses of property. A limited reading
of the delay exception in First English would acknowledge that, from
the landowner's point of view, there is a great difference between a
delay occasioned by negotiating permit procedures and one brought
on by a temporary land use restriction that is prohibitive by its terms.
2. Tahoe-Sierra Is Anchored in the First English Dissent
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Supreme Court refused to recognize that the
majority opinion in First English requires compensation when
landowners are aggrieved by temporary regulations that impose an
absolute ban on all economic uses of private property.'87 Although
the Court failed to explain adequately why the traditional
understanding of First English is erroneous, the affirmed Ninth Circuit
decision premised its own narrow understanding on the First English
majority's definition of temporary takings as "those regulatory takings
which are ultimately invalidated by the courts. 1 88  In the Ninth
Circuit's view, this definition meant that "[w]hat is 'temporary' .... is
the taking, which is rendered temporary only when an ordinance that
effects a taking is struck down by a court. In other words, a
permanent regulation leads to a 'temporary' taking when a court
invalidates the ordinance after the taking." 18 9 In short, the Ninth
Circuit believed that a temporary restriction on private property is not
a taking (requiring compensation) unless it is first a restriction that is
time, typically 30 to 60 days").
186. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
("[Tihe very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted.").
187. See TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
First English did decide that a temporary regulation is "not different in
kind" from a permanent one: If either deprives the owner of all use of his
property, the owner is entitled to compensation for the taking. The panel
does not deny that the moratorium here, like the regulation in Lucas,
deprived the owners of the use of their property for its duration. But it
ignores First English's requirement that the owners be compensated for a
temporary taking.
Id.
188. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764,778 (9th Cir. 2000).
189. Id.
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intended to be permanent. This conclusion was, of course, explicitly
adopted in the High Court's Tahoe-Sierra opinion.19
It is hard to swallow this reinterpretation of the doctrine of
"temporary takings." First English says that these takings are "those
regulatory takings" that are judicially "invalidated." Regulatory
takings are, of course, simply property restrictions that go too far.191
The term "invalidation" is more troublesome, but is correctly
understood as referring to the finding and termination of an
uncompensated taking.'92 Thus, First English's definition could be
interpreted as follows: "temporary takings are those restrictions on
property that are found to violate substantive takings law and which
come to an end." This is vastly different than saying that "[t]he
Court's definition.., does not comprehend temporary moratoria,
which from the outset are designed to last for only a limited period of
time."'93 The former definition simply poses the question whether a
temporary restriction can be one of those restrictions that goes so far
as to cause a court to find that it requires compensation. As we have
seen, First English gives a number of reasons for concluding that it
can.
94
One wonders whether the Supreme Court would have arrived at the
same narrow definition of temporary takings-as invalidated
permanent takings-if the property at issue in Tahoe-Sierra were in
the nature of a leasehold interest that expired before the end of the
moratorium, rather than a fee simple.'95 In such a case, there would
190. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1484 (2002) ("[A] permanent deprivation of
the owner's use of the entire area is a taking of the 'parcel as a whole'...." (quoting
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
310 (1987)).
191. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (affirming that "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking" (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922))).
192. Cf. Roberts, supra note 162, at 11,039 (noting that "'invalidated,' in takings
claims, means 'converted into a taking because found to go too far"').
193. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 778.
194. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
195. This same hypothetical was raised by the Supreme Court during oral
arguments in Tahoe-Sierra:
QUESTION: Well, certainly if the respondent here had simply said, we're
going to need your property for 3 years, and so we're going to take a
leasehold interest for 3 years, the respondent would have had to compensate
for that.
MR. BERGER: Chief Justice, I couldn't agree with that more, and I believe
that that is in fact what we're dealing with here.
QUESTION: No, but you're-it seems to me you're not dealing with that
here, because in that hypothetical the person, the third party in fact takes the
property in the sense of using it for that party's own benefit. Here, no one,
the Tahoe Regional Planning Authority isn't using the property for its
benefit. It's saying that during this period of time there are some things that
you can't do.
MR. BERGER: Absolutely true, but this Court's jurisprudence has always
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be no prospect for future uses of the leasehold to mitigate the impact
of the deprivation of all present use. Consequently, one would expect
(or at least hope) that the Court would be constrained to conclude
that that moratorium was so severe as to cause a total taking. This is
particularly true in light of earlier decisions holding that compensation
must be paid when the government takes a leasehold interest 19 6 and
the language in First English indicating that the same principle is
applicable in the context of a denial of all use.197
But, if the Court is willing to isolate a leasehold interest, temporary
takings cannot rest upon the intended permanency of the regulation.
Instead the critical factor must be the immediate impact of the
government's action. Notably, the preeminence of this factor
corresponds nicely with First English's repeated suggestions that the
compensatory remedy is triggered by a denial of all use. 98
In any case, if the Court had merely dismissed the majority opinion
in First English, one might be tempted to attribute its refusal to apply
the case in favor of the Council to a selective examination of the
Court's language. However, the Court went further, and borrowed
from the dissenting opinion in First English to construct a plausible
rationale for the concept of a "temporal whole" parcel and thus, for its
ultimate conclusion that the TRPA moratorium denied less than all
use of the property in question. Judge Kozinski's dissent from a
denial of rehearing en banc in TSPC IV"9 accurately cataloged the
"uncanny resemblance" between the temporal whole theory adopted
by the Ninth Circuit and affirmed by the Supreme Court and Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion in First English.
Here's why Justice Stevens disagreed with First English:
Regulations are three dimensional; they have depth, width, and
length. As for depth, regulations define the extent to which the
owner may not use the property in question. With respect to width,
regulations define the amount of property encompassed by the
restrictions. Finally, and for purposes of this case, essentially,
regulations set forth the duration of the restrictions. It is obvious
that no one of these elements can be analyzed alone to evaluate the
examined cases like this from the impact on the property owner, not from
what the Government gains by the taking. Justice Holmes said that in
Boston Chamber of Commerce case a century ago.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. 00-1167, 2002
U.S. TRANS LEXIS 2, at *6-7 (Jan. 7, 2002).
196. See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
197. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987) ("'[T]emporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use
of his property are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the
Constitution clearly requires compensation.").
198. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
199. 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
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impact of a regulation, and hence to determine whether a taking has
occurred.... In assessing the economic effect of a regulation, one
cannot conduct the inquiry without considering the duration of the
restriction.... Why should there be a constitutional distinction
between a permanent restriction that only reduces the economic
value of the property by a fraction-perhaps one-third-and a
restriction that merely postpones the development of a property for
a fraction of its useful life-presumably far less than a third? 2°°
And here is the key passage from the TSPC IV panel's opinion:
Property interests may have many different dimensions. For
example, the dimensions of a property interest may include a
physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of the
property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the
extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in
question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration
of the property interest) .... A planning regulation that prevents
the development of a parcel for a temporary period of time is
conceptually no different than a land-use restriction that
permanently denies all use on a discrete portion of property, or that
permanently restricts a type of use across all of the parcel. Each of
these three types of regulation will have an impact on the parcel's
value .... There is no plausible basis on which to distinguish a
similar diminution in value that results from a temporary suspension
of development.20'
In affirming the above reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the Tahoe-
Sierra Court avoided similarly overt references to the First English
dissent, but the footprints are unmistakable.2 2 Indeed, much of the
Tahoe-Sierra opinion reads like it was lifted from Stevens' First
English dissent-from the Court's discussion in dicta about the
relationship between physical and regulatory takings,2 3 to its
200. Id. at 1000 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 330, 332 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
201. Id. (quoting TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 774, 776, 777 (9th Cir. 2000)).
202. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1484 (2002). The Supreme Court
rationalized its adoption of the "temporal whole" parcel this way:
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe
its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal
aspect of the owner's interest. Both dimensions must be considered if the
interest is to be viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of
the owner's use of the entire area is a taking of the "parcel as a whole,"
whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is
not. Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.
Id.
203. Stevens' First English dissent had this to say about the distinction between
physical and regulatory takings:
[Elven minimal physical occupations constitute takings which give rise to a
duty to compensate. But our cases also make it clear that regulatory takings
and physical takings are very different in this, as well as other, respects.
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observation that temporary restrictions can indeed cause a taking,
provided the duration is taken into account.2 °4
It seems clear that Tahoe-Sierra adopted and (as Judge Kozinski
put it) the Ninth Circuit "plagiariz[ed]" the reasoning and language of
the First English dissent, °0 but one might argue that "[dissenting
While virtually all physical invasions are deemed takings, a regulatory
program that adversely affects property values does not constitute a taking
unless it destroys a major portion of the property's value. This diminution of
value inquiry is unique to regulatory takings. Unlike physical invasions,
which are relatively rare and easily identifiable without making any
economic analysis, regulatory programs constantly affect property values in
countless ways, and only the most extreme regulations can constitute
takings.
First English, 482 U.S. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
And here is what the Tahoe-Sierra majority said:
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property
for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former
owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire
parcel or merely part thereof.... This longstanding distinction between
acquisitions of property for public use, on the one hand, and regulations
prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases
involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a
claim that there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice versa. For the
same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appropriation advances a
substantial governmental interest or whether it deprives the owner of all
economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical
takings context to regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential
way-often in completely unanticipated ways .... By contrast, physical
appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a
greater affront to individual property rights.
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478-79 (citations omitted).
204. Stevens said this in his First English dissent:
I am willing to assume that some cases may arise in which a property owner
can show that prospective invalidation of the regulation cannot cure the
taking-that the temporary operation of a regulation has caused such a
significant diminution in the property's value that compensation must be
afforded for the taking that has already occurred. For this ever to happen,
the restriction on the use of the property would not only have to be a
substantial one, but it would also have to remain in effect for a significant
percentage of the property's useful life. In such a case an application of our
test for regulatory takings would obviously require an inquiry into the
duration of the restriction, as well as its scope and severity.
482 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Stevens offered the following in Tahoe-Sierra:
[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction
precludes finding that it effects a taking .... [Tihe answer to the abstract
question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is neither "yes,
always" nor "no, never"; the answer depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case .... [A] permanent deprivation of the owner's use
of the entire area is a taking.., whereas a temporary restriction that merely
causes a diminution in value is not .... In our view, the duration of the
restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the
appraisal of a regulatory takings claim ....
122 S. Ct. at 1478-89.
205. First English, 482 U.S. at 331.
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Justice Stevens'] broader statements about the temporal dimension of
property were not rejected by the majority, and remain viable on the
question of when a taking occurs."'6 It is equally likely, however, that
it was a decision on the part of the First English majority to act
contrary to Stevens' "broader statements about the temporal
dimension of property" that prompted him to make those very
statements in the first place.2 7 This is particularly true in light of the
abundance of language in the majority opinion that is patently
inconsistent with Stevens' discussion of the temporal dimension"" and
given that, although some commentators apparently think
differently,2"9 the First English majority gave absolutely no indication
that it was inclined, as a general matter, to aggregate all the elements
of property ownership when evaluating the impact of a regulation.
All in all, it would not require much imagination to conclude that
the Tahoe-Sierra Court adopted an analytical paradigm that had been
previously rejected by the majority in First English.21 Interestingly,
the Court justified its questionable take on First English as necessary
to shield governments from financial liability and the planning
moratoria from extinction. 1' In this way, the Court resurrected the
California Supreme Court's opinion in Agins, which refused to grant
monetary damages for a regulatory taking because of the "need for
preserving a degree of freedom in the land-use planning function, and
the inhibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse
condemnation remedy." ' This brings the sub rosa reversal of First
English full circle, for in that case, the majority also had this to say:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to
some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and
206. Roberts, supra note 162, at 11,043.
207. See First English, 482 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[u]ntil
today, we have repeatedly rejected the notion that all temporary diminutions in the
value of property automatically activate the compensation requirement of the
Takings Clause" (emphasis added)); See also, Michelman, supra note 127, at 1621
("Stevens wrote as though the majority unambiguously bought into a general doctrine
of conceptual severance by timeshares.").
208. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Robert Freilich, Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo: Interim
Development Controls, Moratoria, and Economic Diminution Cases at 8, n.21, ALl-
ABA Course of Study Materials, Planning, Regulation, Litigation, Eminent Domain,
and Compensation (Aug. 2001). Freilich incorrectly suggests that the First English
Court stated: "Regulations are three dimensional; they have depth, width, and
length.... It is obvious that no one of these elements can be analyzed alone to
evaluate the impact of a regulation, and hence to determine whether a taking has
occurred." Although this language did come from First English, it was not a part of
the majority opinion. See First English, 482 U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. See Kellington, supra note 145, at 14 ("The basis for the 9th Circuit majority
opinion seems contrary to First English for the reason that the Supreme Court was
clear that a total deprivation of all economically beneficial use is compensable and it
makes no difference if the regulation is temporary or permanent.").
211. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485-87 (2002).
212. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 35 (Cal. 1979).
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governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use
regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from any
decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the
provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility
and freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them.213
Putting aside precedential doubts, the fear animating the Court's
creative reinterpretation of the temporary takings doctrine-that all
moratoria are endangered by a decision equating permanent and
temporary restrictions-is puzzling. The only moratoria that would
conceivably be "at risk" are those that impose losses severe enough to
warrant engaging in costly and time-consuming litigation. This factor
alone would spare most short-term, good-faith moratoria enacted for
legitimate planning purposes.214 Since the typical moratorium is
reasonable in scope and duration,"5 it is hard to get worked up by the
suggestion that the moratorium will be destroyed as a planning tool if
the conventional understanding of First English prevails.216 On the
contrary, in this context as well as elsewhere, the more likely
prognostication is that temporary takings would continue to be
"relatively rare."
213. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
214. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 19 n.29 (1984)
(observing that landowners are unlikely to litigate unless the harm they are seeking to
remedy is substantial).
215. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Schafer v. New
Orleans, 743 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1984); Arnold Bernhard & Co., Inc. v. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n of Westport, 479 A.2d 801 (Conn. 1984). This point was also
effectively made by a Supreme Court Justice during oral argument:
QUESTION: Well, that's extraordinary. You refer to it, General Olson, as
just a traditional moratorium. I don't think this is a traditional moratorium
at all. I think it's quite extraordinary to just say, you know, a time out,
nobody does anything with this land. I just don't think that that's the normal
kind of moratorium. Nobody does anything beyond the limited use that we
anticipate we will ultimately impose. It's very rare that you impose a
complete prohibition of use, because that's a condemnation.
GENERAL OLSON: It may be unusual, but it is not so rare. In fact, page 5
of the petitioners' brief refers to the two-
QUESTION: Two cases, as a I recall, that involve-total, right, yes.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, No. 00-1167, 2002
U.S. TRANS LEXIS 2, at *44-45 (Jan. 7, 2002).
216. For decisions upholding moratoria, See Santa Fe Village Venture v.
Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1995); Dafau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156
(1990), affd without opinion, 940 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Guinnane v. City &
County of San Francisco, 197 Cal. App. 3d 862; Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d
701 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); McCutchan Estates Corp. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh
County Airport Auth. Dist., 580 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Woodbury Place
Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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B. Tahoe-Sierra Avoids the Thrust of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court faced the task of conforming its decision
to the opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council as well as to
that of the majority in First English. In Lucas, the Court declared that
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires compensation
whenever a regulation deprives a landowner of "all economically
beneficial or productive use of land. ' 217 However, as we have seen,
the Court rejected this line of argument by superimposing the
temporal whole theory, originally articulated in Stevens' First English
dissent, upon the per se rule established in Lucas. While the resulting
limitation of Lucas to permanent regulations may not be as surprising
as the narrow interpretation of First English, the Tahoe-Sierra Court's
treatment of Lucas is difficult to reconcile with the thrust of that
decision.
1. A Brief Overview of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
The dispute in Lucas arose in 1986, when David Lucas purchased
two South Carolina beachfront lots with the intent of building a
single-family residence.218 His plans were thwarted two years later
when the South Carolina legislature adopted the Beachfront
Management Act 219 and directed the South Carolina Coastal Council
to establish a coastal baseline, seaward of which "occupyable
improvements" were prohibited.220 The Council subsequently placed
the line landward of Lucas' lots, thus preventing him from proceeding
with the planned development.22" ' This prompted Lucas to file suit on
the ground that the Council's actions had effected an unconstitutional
taking by depriving him of all use of his land.222
When the United States Supreme Court reviewed the dispute, it
agreed with Lucas that the denial of all economically beneficial use of
his land was sufficient to establish a regulatory taking.223 Writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia reviewed the Court's previous takings
cases and concluded that two categories of regulatory action had been
identified as resulting in a taking without regard to the "public interest
advanced in support of the restraint." '224 The first of these per se
takings categories included cases where the government used its
regulatory power physically to invade or occupy private property or
217. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
218. Id. at 1006-07.
219. S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250 (Supp. 1990).
220. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1009.
223. Id. at 1015.
224. Id.
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authorized third parties to do so. 225  The second consisted of
regulations that "denie[d] all economically beneficial or productive
use of land. '226 Suggesting that a regulatory deprivation of productive
use is the equivalent, from the landowner's point of view, of a physical
occupation, Scalia concluded that "when the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking. ' 227 Under this categorical
rule, compensation is owed when a regulation deprives a landowner of
all economically viable use of property without respect to the public
purposes behind the regulation or whether the landowner had notice
that he would be so regulated at the time of purchase.28 A limited
exception for regulations enacted pursuant to "background principles
of [a] State's law of property. 229
2. Tahoe-Sierra Finesses the Meaning of "Economically
Beneficial Use"
Since the Lucas decision, courts and commentators have struggled
to understand the scope of the categorical rule.230  The confusion
stems in large measure from the Court's failure to articulate precisely
what constitutes a denial of all "economically beneficial or productive
use." 23 1 At times the Court has suggested that the rule requires the
government to refrain from regulating away all available physical uses
of land,232 a perspective supported by other cases233 and some
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1019.
228. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
Were we to accept the State's [notice] rule, the postenactment transfer of
title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This
ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge
unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.
Id.
229. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. In order to avoid a taking where all productive
use is denied, land use restrictions "must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership." Id. For discussion of the scope of this exception, see David L.
Callies & J. David Breemer, Background Principles: Custom Public Trust, and
Preexisting Statutes as Exceptions to Regulatory Takings, in Taking Sides, supra note
7.
230. Compare James Burling, Can Property Value Avert a Regulatory Taking When
Economically Beneficial Use Has Been Destroyed?, in Taking Sides, supra note 7, with
Douglas T. Kendall, Defining the Lucas Box: Palazzolo, Tahoe and the Use/Value
Debate, in Taking Sides, supra note 7.
231. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 780 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The central confusion over
its meaning centers on the relationship between the 'use' of property and its
'value."').
232. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (suggesting that the economically beneficial use
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commentators.234 However, at other times, and sometimes in the same
breath,235 the Court has indicated that the categorical test simply
requires regulations to leave property with some residual "value." '236
This vacillation has understandably led to an ongoing and unresolved
debate about the factual circumstances, and particularly, the level of
remaining value or use, sufficient to satisfy the Lucas test.237
In TSPC IV, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the use versus value
debate, but declined to take sides, 238 even though the district court had
relied on a previous Ninth Circuit decision suggesting that the critical
rule is violated if landowners are prohibited from making "habitable or productive
improvements"); id. at 1017 ("[F]or what is land, but the profits thereof[?]"); id. at
1018 (stating that "regulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be
left substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm"); id. at 1025 n.12 (referring to "all developmental or
economically beneficial land uses").
233. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987)
(emphasizing the "right" to build on private property); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 352-53 (1986) (suggesting that the ability to engage in
"some development" is a critical factor in takings inquiry).
234. See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost Of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its
Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605, 629 (1996) ("The right to
various uses of land is the Court's newest source of core property rights."); David L.
Callies, Taking the Taking Issue into the Twenty-first Century, in After Lucas: Land
Use Regulation and the Taking of Property Without Compensation 5 (David L.
Callies ed., 1993) (stating that "the [Lucas] Court did not say the regulation had to
render the property valueless, but only devoid of economically beneficial use");
Burling, supra note 230, at 452-53 (arguing that the Supreme Court's takings decisions
are anchored in fundamental conceptions of property rights, including the right to use
land); Lycett, supra note 145, at 65 (noting that the Lucas "rule applies even though a
property with no economically viable use may still hold substantial market value").
235. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 ("In the case of land, however, we think the notion
pressed by the Council that title is somehow held subject to the 'implied limitation'
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent
with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture." (emphasis added)).
236. Id. at 1016 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation of all
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not
make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured.")
(emphasis added); id. at 1019-20 n.8 (noting that in "some cases the landowner with
95% loss [of value] will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in
full" under the economically beneficial use rule); id. at 1026 (noting that no previous
cases that "employed the logic of 'harmful use' prevention to sustain a regulation
involved an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the
claimant's land." (emphasis added)).
237. Compare Freilich, supra note 209, at 6 n.17 ("'[A]II value' as used in Lucas
means that the regulation has permanently destroyed all value, both in a physical
nature and temporal sense."), with David L. Callies, After Lucas and Dolan: An
Introductory Essay, in Takings: Land-Development Conditions and Regulatory
Takings after Dolan and Lucas 8 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) ("The property interest
need not be valueless (of the majority, only Justice Kennedy regularly uses the term
'value' in analysis) to qualify for compensation [under Lucas].").
238. See TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 780-81 (9th Cir. 2000).
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focus is use.239 Instead, the Court of Appeals sidestepped the issue by
concluding that the moratorium neither denied the Tahoe landowners
all physical use of land nor rendered their properties valueless.2 ° The
Ninth Circuit held that "[g]iven that the [TRPA] ordinance and
resolution banned development for only a limited period, these
regulations preserved the bulk of the future developmental use of the
property. This future use had a substantial present value." '241 The
court subsequently stressed that the moratorium did not deprive the
landowners of all physical use of land because "[t]he 'use' of [their]
property runs from the present to the future" in light of the adopted
theory of the temporal whole.242 In its decision, the United States
Supreme Court bought into the same framework and reached the
same results.
The Court's treatment of Lucas thus hinges on the "future
developmental uses" of Tahoe-area properties. This formulation begs
the question of what future uses the Court has in mind. After all,
during the moratorium period, and throughout the Tahoe-Sierra
litigation, TRPA gave no indication that area landowners would be
allowed to develop at any point in the future. Even today, the ability
to develop around Tahoe is largely based on a lottery system that
assures no particular properties of future developmental uses.243
Therefore, any future uses were and are potential and undetermined.
Consequently, we must understand that any value left in the Tahoe
properties is the minimal value that derives from speculation premised
on the possible rescission of regulation.
It is difficult to believe that when the Lucas Court required the
retention of "economically beneficial uses" to avoid a taking, it was
thinking about potential uses in the distant future. Although the trial
court characterized the challenged Beachfront Management Act as
"permanent,"2" this distinction does not necessarily account for the
Lucas decision since the possibility existed that Lucas could make use
of his property sometime in the distant future, regardless of the
purported duration of the regulation.
It is important to recall that South Carolina had prevented David
Lucas from engaging in what had, up to the enactment of the
challenged law, been a presently available physical use of his land-
239. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242 (D. Nev. 1999) (relying on Del Monte
Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1996), affd, 526 U.S. 687
(1999)).
240. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 780-81.
241. Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
242. Id. at 782.
243. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 730 (1997).
244. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S 1003, 1009 (1992) (noting
that "[t]he trial court further found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a
permanent ban on construction insofar as Lucas' lots were concerned").
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the construction of single-family homes.245 Lucas' suit was, therefore,
based on his inability to proceed with plans to use his land in this
economically beneficial manner.246 It was this present context, not
concerns about what might be allowed thirty years from the
enactment of the Act, that gave rise to the economically beneficial use
rule.
The Lucas Court's discussion of the situation that would exist if
Lucas had been returned to the status quo ante suggests that it was
responding to, and thinking of, the government's impact on previously
allowable uses when it framed the "economically beneficial use"
standard.2 47 Noting that the Act had been altered after Lucas' suit was
rejected by the South Carolina Supreme Court to provide for the
possibility of a special permit for building seaward of the setback line,
the Court stated that the state court's rejection of the suit
does not preclude Lucas from applying for a permit... for future
construction, and challenging, on takings grounds, any denial. But it
does preclude, both practically and legally, any takings claim with
respect to Lucas' past deprivation, i.e., for his having been denied
construction rights during the period before the 1990 amendment.248
The Court then cited First English for the proposition that "temporary
deprivations of use are compensable under the Takings Clause. 249
This section fuels the idea that the availability of present uses is the
locus of the Lucas test 211 since it suggests that Lucas had a legitimate
takings claim for a denial of all beneficial use for a finite period, even
though he might enjoy such uses in the future.
To the extent that Lucas equates the required "economically
beneficial uses" with positive economic value, it is highly doubtful that
the Court was thinking of speculative value. One should recognize
that during the time the Act prevented the use of Lucas' lots, the
possibility clearly existed that this law would be repealed or altered
some time in the future, or that some other event would occur,
making it possible for Lucas or his successors to build once again.
245. See id. at 1008.
246. Id. Immediately after purchasing his lots in 1986, Lucas "commissioned
architectural drawings" for the purpose of building single-family residences on the
lots. It was the inability to proceed with these plans that prompted Lucas to file suit
soon after the 1988 enactment of the Beachfront Management Act.
247. Id. at 1011.
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 1012.
250. Ironically, the Ninth Circuit provides implicit support for this reasoning when
it states in TSPC IV that "had we engaged in conceptual severance, we would have
read into the Takings Clause a requirement that the government never interfere with
a property owner's wish to put his property to immediate use." TSPC IV, 216 F.3d
764, 782 n.28 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Lucas Court viewed First English as requiring
compensation for temporally limited denials of all property use, it follows, under the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, that it was establishing a general rule requiring the
retention of some immediately foreseeable uses.
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That this prospect would have created some speculative present value
in the lots is undeniable from an economic point of view. Therefore,
when the trial court found that Lucas' lots were rendered
"valueless, ' '211 a conclusion accepted by the Lucas majority,252 it is
reasonable to believe that it was referring to the value of permitted
present uses under the terms of the Act. The lots retained, in other
words, the same type of value as that which the Court saw in the
Tahoe properties, but in Lucas, this was not sufficient to shield the
government from liability for a regulatory taking. In Palazzolo, the
Court reaffirmed this reading, declaring that "a State may not evade
the duty to compensate on the premise that the landowner is left with
a token interest. 2
53
There is an important reason for finding a focus for the
"economically beneficial use" rule in previously allowable uses, rather
than in speculative value and hypothetical future uses, namely, that
the latter approach tends to render the categorical rule meaningless.
After all, land will always have minimal value, even under a draconian
permanent regulation, since there will always be someone willing to
gamble that restrictions will be rescinded at some point in the
future.254 If the categorical rule is satisfied by this type of value, it will
always be satisfied, and there can be no taking under Lucas. Indeed,
under such a framework, there could have been no taking in Lucas
itself since the salvage uses that remained in Lucas' lots after the
enactment of the Beachfront Management Act must have given rise to
value greater than zero. Similar reasoning applies with respect to
future speculative uses. As the Court of Claims has recognized, "[i]f
passively holding land against the possibility that restrictions on its use
will be lifted were deemed a productive economic use, property would
never be rendered useless by regulation. '25 5 Again, there could be no
taking under Lucas. On the other hand, if categorical takings may be
defeated only by the retention of some viable present use, Lucas
takings will be "relatively rare," but they will occur when a landowner
is, like Lucas and members of the Tahoe Council, required to leave
property substantially in its natural state.256
In light of the foregoing, it is easy to understand why the Tahoe
landowners relied heavily on Lucas. The use restrictions imposed on
the Tahoe-area landowners were as drastic as those that Lucas
251. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020.
252. Id. at 1020 n.9.
253. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,609 (2001).
254. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
255. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 166 n.6 (1985).
256. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (noting that regulations "typically" leave the property
owners without economically beneficial use when "requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state").
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successfully challenged, and in some cases, even more restrictive.257
As a result only a handful of the 8000-9000 undeveloped Tahoe basin
lots were sold between 1981 and 1990, and these fetched "relatively
low prices. 2 58 All of which tends to support the sense that TRPA
merely left the Tahoe landowners with the residual value associated
with the possibility that someone would someday be permitted to
build a home on the subject lots.259 The only obvious difference
between Lucas and Tahoe-Sierra is that the regulation in the latter
case had a foreseeable end when it was enacted.26 In retrospect, this
turns out to be a critical distinction, but only because the Court
refused to give weight to First English's suggestion that temporary
denials of all use are compensable.261
257. In Lucas, "[t]he Act [at issue] did allow the construction of certain
nonhabitable improvements, e.g., 'wooden walkways no larger in width than six feet,'
and 'small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square feet."' Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1009 n.2. On the other hand, the moratorium imposed by TRPA
prevented SEZ landowners from engaging in any "grading, clearing, removal of
vegetation, filling or creation of land coverage." TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1243 (D.
Nev.).
258. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
259. Id. at 1244.
260. See TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) ("The only difference between this case and Lucas is that
the regulation here had a finite duration.").
261. Id. at 999-1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
[T]he question [in TSPC] is whether there is something special about a finite
moratorium that relieves the government from its duty to compensate
[under Lucas]. The Supreme Court answered this question in First English
when it said that 'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a landowner all
use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.
Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 305 (1987)); see also Kellington, supra note 145, at 1 (stating
that together, Lucas and First English "state that temporary development regulations
that forbid all economically viable use of property are compensable under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution"). Significantly, if Lucas governed
temporary restrictions, the public purposes served by the regulation would be
irrelevant in considering whether a taking has actually occurred. See Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1015. In Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States the court observed that
Lucas
teaches that the economic impact factor alone may be determinative; in
some circumstances, no balancing of factors is required. If a regulation
categorically prohibits all economically beneficial use of land-destroying its
economic value for private ownership-the regulation has an effect
equivalent to a physical occupation. There is, without more, a compensable
taking.
18 F.3d 1560, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The government could avoid compensation only if it could show that the
imposed use restrictions are consistent with "background principles" of property law.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004; see generally David L. Callies & J. David Breemer,
Background Principles: Custom, Public Trust, and Preexisting Statutes as Exceptions to
Regulatory Takings, in TakingSides, supra note 7. Although the Court did not reach
the background principles issue in Tahoe-Sierra, it is unlikely that TRPA could have
made the necessary showing, given that such principles "rarely support prohibition of
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C. The Amorphous Basis for Application of the "Whole Parcel"
Principle to the Temporal Dimension
The Supreme Court was able to avoid Lucas primarily by applying
the "all economically beneficial use" rule within a "temporal whole"
framework in which future property uses become relevant. 262 This
framework is troubling on its own terms as well as for its roots in the
First English dissent. To be specific, despite the Court's declarations
to the contrary, it is hard to view the "temporal, whole" theory as a
manifestation of the relevant parcel analysis. Admittedly, there is
little agreement as to what constitutes the relevant parcel in
regulatory takings law.263  Often described as the "parcel as a
whole, '' "6 this definition simply begs the question of what is the
"whole parcel" and opens the door to shifting and inconsistent
determinations of the property interest to which takings analysis is to
be applied. However, the Court's answer, that the "whole" or
relevant parcel encompasses the entire "useful life" of real property,
represents a surprising expansion.
As an initial matter, it is notable that courts typically engage in the
relevant parcel inquiry in cases involving two or more spatially or
functionally defined property interests.265 Perhaps the most well-
known example of the relevant parcel problem arises from the 1978
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.266 The
question there was whether denial of an application to construct an
office building on top of New York City's famous Grand Central
Terminal constituted a taking.267 The proposed addition to the
Terminal was rejected pursuant to a Landmarks Preservation Law
under which the Terminal was designated a landmark and the "city
tax block" it occupied was designated a "landmark site." Appellant
owners of the Terminal also owned other property in the same area of
midtown Manhattan.268
the 'essential use' of land," such as the construction of "habitable or productive
improvements," or uses that have "long been engaged in by similarly situated
owners." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
262. See generally Eagle, supra note 164, at 11,236. But see Tedra Fox, Note, Lake
Tahoe's Temporary Development Moratorium: Why a Stitch in Time Should Not
Define the Property Interest in a Takings Claim, 28 Ecology L.Q. 399, 403 (2001)
(prosaically arguing that "the Ninth Circuit wisely cast aside conceptual severance,
which has the potential to produce absurd results, in favor of a holistic conception of
property that preserves the ability of communities to thoughtfully plan their futures").
263. See generally Fee, supra note 17.
264. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
265. See generally Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator
Problem, 27 Rutgers L.J. 663, 668 (1996) (stating that "the denominator issue is most
commonly found in cases dealing with the horizontal subdivision of land, it is not
limited to that context").
266. 438 U.S. 104.
267. Id. at 122.
268. Id. at 115-18.
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The Penn Central majority noted that takings cases examine the
character of the government action and the nature of interference
with rights in the "parcel as a whole," '269 stating "'[t]aking
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have
been entirely abrogated. 2 7' The interference with appellants'
property rights in Penn Central was insufficient to effect a taking
because the restrictions "afford appellants opportunities further to
enhance not only the Terminal site proper [the city tax block] but also
other properties. 2 71  Thus, the relevant parcel for takings analysis
included not only the air space above the Terminal, but the Terminal
itself, the land on which it sits, and appellant's other properties in the
area.
272
Since the decision in Penn Central, courts have continued to
struggle with the "parcel as a whole" principle in cases involving the
appropriation of a spatially defined property interest,273 while rarely
applying it to expand the "temporal dimension" of property in
temporary takings cases. 274  When the time-frame of a taking is
implicated, courts typically limit the examination to discrete time
periods that are immediately relevant to the factual basis of the
case. 275 This holds true in the regulatory takings context 2 76 as well as
269. Id. at 130-31.
270. Id. at 130.
271. Id. at 138.
272. Id. at 137-38. In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist argued that the air rights
themselves should be the analytical focus and on that basis, there was a taking. Id. at
143 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
273. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 400-02 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a governmental demand that a landowner dedicate an
easement in return for development permission did not cause a taking because the
Court's cases "require the analysis to focus on the impact of the city's actions on the
entire parcel of private property"); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 497-99 (1987) (affirming that courts must look to the
"parcel as a whole" in concluding that a law that required coal companies to leave a
portion of their coal in place as surface support did not rise to the level of a taking);
see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993) (declaring that a company subject to monetary liability
could not divide its interests into "what was taken and what was left" in order to
establish a taking).
274. But see Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258, 261-
63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
275. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999). In Del
Monte Dunes, a jury found the city liable for a taking after it repeatedly denied a
landowner's applications (each one scaled down to meet the city's concerns) for a
development permit during a seven-year period that ended when the state of
California purchased the property. Id. at 701. The situation that confronted the
landowner and the courts was analogous to that arising from application of a
temporary moratorium; given the city's continued assurances, the landowner had
reason to believe that the city's reticence would end and the landowner would be
granted a permit in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, the property must have
retained some present value and some prospect for future use during the permit
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in cases involving a physical invasion of property.2 77 This is not really
surprising since the very notion of a temporary regulatory taking,
which is well-established in federal and state court jurisprudence,
implies a limit on the temporal framework under which the underlying
takings claim is to be analyzed. 8
The courts' refusal to aggregate temporally defined interests in the
tradition of Penn Central reflects an understanding of the relevant
parcel inquiry as one that is at least confined by a common sense
interpretation of the property interests and individuals that are
impacted by a particular regulation.279 In Lucas, the Court made it
negotiations. Still, none of the tribunals that reviewed the case, including the Court,
contemplated reversing the jury's instructions and its findings under those instructions
based on these grounds. In fact, the Court upheld the jury's resolution of what it
described as a "claim for a temporary regulatory taking." Id. at 704; Eberle v. Dane
County Bd. of Adjustment, 595 N.W.2d 730, 742 n.25 (Wis. 1999) (describing Del
Monte Dunes as "holding that the question of whether a city's repeated refusals to
approve development plans deprived a landowner of all economically viable use of
the land, and thereby amounted to a temporary regulatory taking, was properly
submitted to a jury, and citing First English with approval"); see generally Michael C.
LeVine, Note, How Permanent Became Temporary in Del Monte Dunes, 49 Duke L.
J. 803 (1999). It is also instructive to compare the Tahoe-Sierra approach to that
followed in Tabb Lakes, Ltd., v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In Tabb
Lakes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") issued an illegal order
preventing a development company from proceeding with plans to build residential
units on three sections of the company's property. Id. at 798-99. After the order was
struck down, the company sued for a temporary taking, claiming that it was denied all
beneficial use of the regulated property for the ten-month period during which the
order was in effect. Id. at 799. While agreeing that "a taking, even for a day, without
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution," id. at 800, the Federal Circuit
rejected the takings claim on the ground that the claimant could have applied for and
received a permit overcoming the order and thus had suffered only a fluctuation in
property value. Id. at 800-01. The court suggested, however, that the claim would
also fail on application of the "parcel as a whole" principle. Id. at 802. Specifically, it
implied that application of this principle would extend the spatial boundaries of the
claimant's land and thus lessen the effect of the order on the company's property
value. Id. At the same time, while the factual circumstances in Tabb Lakes were quite
similar to those in Tahoe-Sierra, and the relevant authorities in both cases identical,
the Federal Circuit failed to give any indication that it was possible to employ the
"whole parcel" principle to examine the temporal size of the claimant's parcel in order
to defeat the claim.
276. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 515-16 (Ariz. 1986)
(holding that a zoning ordinance that denied a landowner substantially all use of
property effected a temporary taking under Arizona Constitution during its effective
period); Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 875 (Fla. 2001) (holding that a
one-year closure of a business pursuant to a nuisance abatement law amounted to a
taking under Lucas); Alexander v. Town of Jupiter, 640 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that a temporary denial of a permit to clear trees "amounted to a
temporary taking of all use of property ... and as such was ripe for adjudication of the
compensation claim raised"); Eberle, 595 N.W.2d at 740-41 (holding that temporary
denial of a permit facilitating access to private property resulted in a temporary taking
under the Wisconsin Constitution).
277. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
278. See Eagle, supra note 164, at 11,237.
279. See Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings 793 (2nd ed. 2001) (noting that the
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clear that the relevant parcel inquiry should be guided by an
interpretation 28 that reflects basic notions of common-sense and
fairness when it stated "[f]or an extreme-and we think,
unsupportable-view of the relevant calculus, see [the state court
opinion] in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, where
the state court examined the diminution in... value.., in light of
total value of the takings claimant's other holdings in the vicinity."28'
In TSPC, the Nevada district court applied similar reasoning,
declaring that the fact that some Tahoe lot owners might own several
non-contiguous parcels was irrelevant to its consideration of the
impact of the moratorium on each independent piece of property.282
The same concern for the viewpoint of the landowner shows up in
lower federal and state court decisions resolving the relevant parcel
question by an ad hoc approach that involves consideration of
numerous factors.2"3 These courts have held, for instance, that a
portion of a larger parcel should be viewed in isolation if there is little
chance the government will allow development of other sections, that
a lot zoned differently from another alleged to have been taken is not
relevant,8 that two adjacent parcels should be considered separately
if the owner so treats them 285 and that an undeveloped portion of a
larger developed parcel should be considered separately in large part
because the government did not regulate it until after the owner
submitted an application for development. 286  Even in cases that
ultimately propose a more expansive view of the relevant parcel, the
expectations of the affected landowner are usually considered as part
of the analysis.287
Lucas Court's rejection of the expansive relevant parcel in Penn Central "suggests
that the Court will take a commonsense approach to the takings denominator,
perhaps through extending a presumption of validity to estates commonly employed
in the vicinity of similar projects where specific regulatory concerns were not an
issue").
280. See generally, Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is
Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984); Christopher S. Kiefer, Note, Reconciling
the Internal Inconsistency and Resolving the Denominator Problem in Takings Law, 10
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 171 (2000).
281. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 n.7 (1992)
(citations omitted).
282. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1244 (D. Nev. 1999) ("The fact that a plaintiff may
own two or more non-contiguous lots is irrelevant-each lot is considered
separately.").
283. See Lisker, supra note 265, at 720 ("[H]istorically the Takings Clause was
designed to protect private citizens from governmental interference with property
rights. Therefore, it makes sense.., to tip the scales slightly in the plaintiff's favor.").
284. Twain Harte Assocs. Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne, 217 Cal. App. 3d 71, 85-88
(1990).
285. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Matin, 653 F.2d 364, 372 (9th Cir.
1981).
286. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
287. See, e.g., Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-20 (1991) (considering
factors such as extent to which parcel treated as a single unit, degree of contiguity
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What makes the "temporal whole" theory embraced in Tahoe-
Sierra so problematic is that it is completely disconnected from the
common sense calculations that have traditionally, if not overtly,
characterized the relevant parcel inquiry. Requiring courts to take
into account a non-existent future parcel, in fact, amounts to the
functional equivalent of the approach rejected in Lucas; it too injects
interests into the calculus that are clearly tangential to the regulatory
action at issue. Indeed, the inclusion of speculative future interests is
even more suspect; not only are such interests totally unrelated to the
challenged regulation, but they may have little connection to the
plaintiffs who must shoulder the resulting regulatory burdens. This is
the most glaring difference between the "temporal whole" concept
and traditional applications of the "parcel as a whole" principle: the
former theory permits the aggregation of interests that a landowner
does not even own to create the relevant parcel. In short, it can limit
the landowner's right to compensation because someone else may get
to use the property at some point in the future. This might be
appropriate if the Fifth Amendment was intended to protect "tracts of
land" rather than people. 88 But as Justice Miller made clear in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,289 the Court's primary concern is the
impact of government activity on the individual:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing
a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been
adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as
against the government, and which has received the commendation
of jurists, statesmen, and commentators as placing the just principles
of the common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary
legislation to change or control them, it shall be held that if the
government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect,
subject it to total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the
public use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional
provisions into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen, as those
rights stood at the common law, instead of the government, and
make it an authority for invasion of private right under the pretext
of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of
our ancestors.
among potential parcels, dates of acquisition).
288. See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)
(noting that the Just Compensation Clause "deals with persons, not with tracts of
land"); see also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("Property
does not have rights. People have rights.").
289. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
290. Id. at 177-78.
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In opposition to the purpose of the Takings Clause, common sense,
and language in the First English majority opinion, the Tahoe-Sierra
Court points to language in Agins v. Tiburon to support its decision to
adopt an expansive temporal framework. Specifically, the Court
pointed to the statement that: "[m]ere fluctuations in value during the
process of governmental decision making, absent extraordinary delay,
are 'incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a "taking"
in the constitutional sense."'291  The Agins Court made these
comments while holding that an aborted condemnation proceeding,
lasting only about a year and for which the landowners' costs were
reimbursed,292 did not rise to the level of a taking.293
While the Agins language may be relevant in limited cases to the
question of whether a temporary restriction can cause a taking,
holding that the good-faith termination of eminent domain
proceedings does not require compensation is quite different than
saying that a temporary regulation can never diminish uses of
property enough to cause a taking on that basis alone. Indeed, the
Agins language seems more akin to an early manifestation of the
"normal delay" exception in First English, rather than to an extension
of the "parcel as a whole" principle to temporally defined interests.294
This is especially true in light of the fact that the Agins language
acknowledges the propriety of compensation for temporary
restrictions at least in cases of "extraordinary delay." '95  More
importantly, the subsequent discussion of temporary takings in First
English seems to preclude lower courts from "relying on Agins to
argue that the temporary nature of the interference with the use of the
property in question removes it from the category of a taking." '296
291. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (quoting Danforth v.
United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)). The full Agins quote reads,
The State Supreme Court correctly rejected the contention that the
municipality's good faith planning activities, which did not result in the
successful prosecution of an eminent domain claim so burdened the
appellants' enjoyment of their property so as to constitute a taking. Even if
the appellants' ability to sell their property was limited during the pendency
of the condemnation proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop
their property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in value
during the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraordinary
delay, are "incidents of ownership. They cannot be considered as a 'taking' in
the constitutional sense."
Id. (emphasis added), quoted in TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764, 776 (2000).
292. Agins, at 257-58, n.1.
293. Id. at 258 n.3.
294. The First English Court itself implied that Agins' rejection of the takings claim
arising from the aborted condemnation proceeding was an application of the "normal
delay" exception by describing the proceeding as non-compensable "preliminary
activity." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 320 (1987).
295. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
296. Front Royal and Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front
Royal, 708 F. Supp. 1477, 1483 n.6 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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In any case, the "temporal whole" theory has little overt support in
the Supreme Court's previous takings jurisprudence and is
inconsistent with the manner in which courts have traditionally
approached the relevant parcel problem in general. The theory's
conspicuous absence in takings jurisprudence may owe to the fact that
it tempts the government to abuse property rights by engaging in the
successive enactment of one temporary moratorium after another,297
strategic planning behavior that the Court has rejected in a different
context.298 Or it may be because the theory creates unsupportable
distinctions in application of the Takings Clause: the landowner who is
denied all use of property for five years under a temporary restriction
is entitled to nothing, while the owner restricted under a permanent
regulation that is invalidated after five years has a right to full
compensation. In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the notice rule, which hinges the viability of a takings claim on
whether the challenged regulation pre-dates the acquisition of
property,299 is contrary to the Lucas per se rule for similar reasons? °°
In sum, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tahoe-Sierra,
a logical and precedential basis existed for refusing suddenly to
expand the temporal boundaries of a takings parcel. From there, a
fairly straightforward application of Lucas and First English would
confirm that a 32-month moratorium on all economically beneficial
uses of property is compensable in the same manner as a permanent
deprivation of all use. However, as the Court's opinion revealed, the
strong foundations for such a holding were undermined by the visceral
fear that it would endanger ordinary building delays and impose
prohibitive financial burdens on land use planners.30 1
As we have seen, there are good reasons for believing that this fear
297. See TSPC IV, 228 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Kozinski argued,
If a local government can evade its constitutional obligations by describing
regulations as "temporary," we create a sizable loophole to the Takings
Clause. Why would a government enact a permanent regulation-and risk
incurring an obligation to compensate-when it can enact one moratorium
after another, perhaps indefinitely? Under the theory adopted by the
(TSPC IV) panel, it's hard to see when a property owner would ever state a
takings claim against such a scheme.
Id.
298. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (upholding
taking where city delayed development for five years by rejecting five successive
planning submissions and 19 site plans).
299. See generally R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed
Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 449 (2001).
300. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 ("The proposed rule [that a post-regulatory
enactment transfer of property precludes a taking] is... capricious in effect. The
young owner contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold
contrasted with the owner with the need to sell, would be in different positions.").
301. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485 (2002).
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is exaggerated, not the least of which is the existence of First English's
exception for "normal delays,""3 2 and for recognizing that it should not
be sufficient to support restrictions that would otherwise amount to a
taking under a literal reading of the Court's precedent.3" 3 But in
Tahoe-Sierra, these points failed to carry the day.30 4 The Court's
response-to reject a per se rule while recognizing that temporary
restrictions can result in a taking under ad hoc Penn Central
framework-is probably intended to mollify governmental fears while
deterring the most extreme moratoria and bad-faith usage of that
device to stall reasonable development indefinitely."' Time will
determine whether the Tahoe-Sierra decision actually functions in this
manner or whether it is misread to insulate moratoria as a whole from
takings challenges.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE UNDISCOVERED TAKING
For almost twenty years, property owners in the Tahoe Basin have
sought to vindicate a simple but important constitutional precept:
when the government puts private property to public use, it must pay
just compensation.306  There is no question that the Council's
properties have been so used -their lands remain undeveloped solely
so that the public at large can enjoy an algae-free Lake Tahoe and
their rights have been reduced to "paying taxes, suffering foreclosure
or selling their lots at bargain-basement prices."3"7 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit has applied one procedural bar after another to the
landowners' attempts to obtain some compensation for being forced
to commit their land to benefit the general public.3118 It has done so
despite the fact that in two pre-Tahoe-Sierra cases, the Court forced
the Ninth Circuit to modify its protective view of the TRPA to allow
takings suits against the agency to go forward.3 °9
302. See supra notes 177-86 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
304. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1492 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
First English's "normal delay" exception mitigated the risk that holding draconian
moratoria to be a per se taking would endanger typical permitting delays).
305. See id. at 1484 (recognizing that a moratorium like that in Tahoe-Sierra could
rise to a taking under several theories grounded in "fairness and justice"); id. at 1489
("It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year should be
viewed with special skepticism.").
306. See Michael M. Berger, Clear Need: Keeping Lake Tahoe Pure Doesn't
Preclude Honoring Our Duty to Property Owners, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 3, 2001, A21
("the [TSPC] litigation seeks only compensation for the use of land that has been
plainly, openly and deliberately taken from its titular owners. Frankly, they don't
understand why anyone would contest that.").
307. See Kanner, supra note 53.
308. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
309. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (vacating the
Ninth Circuit's judgment that a takings claim against TRPA arising from the 1987
Regional Plan was unripe because the landowner had not attempted to benefit from
"Transferable Development Rights" which were assigned to her lot by the agency);
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The Ninth Circuit's innovative interpretation of First English and
the temporal parcel concept undoubtedly compelled the Court to
intervene in the Lake Tahoe dispute once more in Tahoe-Sierra. As
the Court's opinion makes clear, such intervention was apparently
required to affirm that a case-by-case balancing test, that takes into
account the temporary duration of a regulation, rather than a per se
rule, governs takings challenges to moratoria. Although we may
never know for sure, the Court was probably correct in raising the
possibility that an application of the relevant test310 would have
resulted in compensation for many of the aggrieved Tahoe-Sierra
landowners.' The economic impact of the moratorium was certainly
severe in denying the owners all economically beneficial use of their
property, for an extended period of years. Similarly, the character of
the governmental action weighs in favor of a taking because TRPA's
extraordinary actions singled out certain landowners to shoulder a
substantial public burden unrelated to "any commitment [they] made
or to any injury they caused." '312
The more difficult question is whether TRPA's regulatory actions
frustrated the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations.
After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, it appears more than ever that, like
the Penn Central test in general, the expectations factor cannot be
reduced to a formula, such as whether the landowner purchased
property prior to the enactment of the regulations, or whether the
landowner seeks to engage in development similar to that allowed in
the area prior to the challenged restriction.313 These and other
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979)
(reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment that TRPA was immune from takings suits
under the Eleventh Amendment).
310. The Penn Central test, confirmed by Tahoe-Sierra as the standard for takings
claims against temporary land use restrictions, "involves a 'complex of factors
including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action."' Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1475 (2002)
(quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
311. Id. at 1478 n.16.
312. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(finding a taking in part under "character of the governmental action" prong where
legislation creating monetary liability "singles out certain employers to bear a burden
that is substantial in amount... and unrelated to any commitment that the employers
made or to any injury they caused").
313. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
the state of regulatory affairs at the time of acquisition is not the only factor
that may determine the extent of investment-backed expectations. For
example, the nature and extent of permitted development under the
regulatory regime vis-a-vis the development sought by the claimant may also
shape legitimate expectations without vesting any kind of development right
in the property owner. We also have never held that a takings claim is
defeated simply on account of the lack of a personal financial investment by
a postenactment acquirer of property, such as a donee, heir, or devisee.
Id. (O'Conner, J., concurring).
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considerations are undoubtedly important, but are to be balanced
against each other with the goal of answering the underlying question:
Did the aggrieved owners have reason to anticipate engaging in the
desired property use prior to the government's intervention and were
they taking steps toward that goal?
In Tahoe-Sierra, most of the Council members can make a strong
case that they had valid, objective reasons for believing that they
would be able to build in the early 1980s. In particular, the vast
majority of these owners purchased property zoned for residential use
long before the 1980s crackdown,3 14 at a time when TRPA still
considered and often approved development applications.3"5
Significantly, most of the purchased lots were "located in partially
developed residential neighborhoods with paved roads, utility service,
and homes built on many of the neighboring lots." 316 On the other
hand, it is possible that some of the owners failed to take steps to
receive development approval before enactment of the moratorium, a
fact that might diminish the otherwise reasonable development
expectations of those who purchased land long before the moratorium
went into effect. But this limiting factor would not diminish the
reasonableness of the expectations of the many landowners that did
move to build prior to the enactment of the moratoria. Moreover, for
the ultimate purpose of finding a taking, the extent of the owners'
expectations must be balanced against the economic impact and
character of the governmental actions,"7 both of which point toward
compensation with respect to the Tahoe landowners.
In hindsight, it is easy to fault the landowners for not pursuing their
valid Penn Central claims. But the strategic decision to proceed under
Lucas was sound at the time it was taken. Again, First English's
language has long been viewed as establishing the equivalency of
permanent and temporary restrictions, especially when all economic
use of property is denied, and case-by-case Penn Central litigation is
an impracticable and unwieldy method for litigating over 400 similar
claims. Still, the quiet end to Tahoe-Sierra is disconcerting,
314. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1472 (noting that 400 members of the Council
with SEZ lands, "purchased their properties prior to the effective date of the 1980
Compact"); Appellee Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council's Answering Brief at 1, n.2,
TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000) (Nos. 99-15641, 99-15771) (on file with author)
("The vast majority of the Plaintiffs are senior citizens, most of whom acquired their
properties at least 25 years ago.").
315. See Tahoe-Sierra 122 S. Ct. at 1472 (stating that "the 1972 ordinance [which
existed until the 1980 Compact was enacted] allowed numerous exceptions and did
not significantly limit the construction of new residential housing").
316. See Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2000) (No. 00-1167),
2000 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1167, at *2.
317. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999) ("[T]he fact that some
plaintiffs may have already held their property for a long period of time would not
exactly weigh in their favor. It would certainly show that they did not intend to build
immediately upon purchase.").
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particularly because it means that many of the Council's elderly
members will never see justice in the form of either compensation or
the construction of their long-sought homes. Hopefully, younger
landowners and future courts will have the opportunity to reveal the
taking that was concealed in Tahoe-Sierra's procedural quagmire. At
that time, courts would do well to consider that TRPA's regulatory
actions have destroyed the dreams of real people, whose lives
encompass a small, but ultimately the only meaningful, slice of the
temporal whole.
Notes & Observations
